Geography is Destiny,
People's Congress?

excerpted from the book

Fixing Elections

The Failure of America's Winner Take All Politics

by Steven Hill

Routledge Press, 2002, hardcover


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Despite a relatively weak record by the Clinton-Gore administration on civil rights, affirmative action, racial profiling, sentencing disparities between crack and powder cocaine offenses, and welfare reform, an astonishing 90 percent of African Americans voted for Gore, as did 62 percent of Latinos and 55 percent of Asians (95 percent of blacks and over 60 percent of Latinos voted against Bush in his home state of Texas, a stunning rejection of the Texas governor's symbolic racial overtures and self-proclaimed "compassionate conservatism") Combined, people of color accounted for an unprecedented 30 percent of Gore's total vote, and nearly 20 percent of all voters.

On the other hand, whites constituted almost 95 percent of Bush's total vote, with white men in particular preferring Bush, as did 80 percent of the white religious right. More revealing, while women overall voted 54-43 for Gore, white women actually favored Bush by one point, 49-48. Women of color created the gender gap. The same can be said of the poor: while 57 percent of voters with incomes under $15,000 voted for Gore, poor whites broke slightly for Bush.

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The national fractures and fault lines revealed by UnElection 2000, then, were geographic, particularly city versus rural; they were regional, with the old Confederate South and the rural and Mountain West opposing the old Union states of the North and Northeast plus the West Coast, with New Mexico, Florida, New Hampshire, and the Midwest as tossups; they were heavily racial, with voting patterns starkly polarized along racial lines approaching that of South Africa's in its first post-apartheid elections ...

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Suburbanites ... tend to be a little more Republican than Democrat, and the candidate that wins this group tends to win the election. In the 2000 presidential election they split 50-50, with the suburbs casting well over 40 percent of the total vote. Fifty years ago, fewer than a quarter of Americans lived in the suburbs, now roughly half do; every ten years another ten members of Congress represent predominantly suburban districts.

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The 2000 U.S. Census reports that the Latino population, now 35.3 million nationwide, rose 58 percent over the past decade and now surpasses that of African Americans.

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... over a third of Asians live in California and New York, large communities now can be found in Georgia, Pennsylvania, Minnesota, and several other states.

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All told, nearly 40 percent of the U.S. population under age 18 is Hispanic, Asian, black, or another minority; minorities account for more than half of the non-adult population in five states-Arizona, California, Texas, New Mexico, and Hawaii.

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... culturally and racially conservative white voters ... still comprise the bulk of the American voters.

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Attack politics have become the modus operandi throughout our two-choice political system. Not only are campaigns relentlessly negative and invasive, but today attacks and wedge issue politicking continue throughout the governing process. What the Clinton impeachment debacle illustrated, as much as anything, is that two-choice, Winner Take All politics has degenerated into a type of gaming and manipulation for partisan advantage that has brought us the specter of the permanent negative campaign. Yet, despite all the national disgust and media attention over negative politicking, there has been surprisingly little discussion by pundits and political scientists about how the two-choice, Winner Take All system substantially drives attack-style tactics. In fact, it is malignantly suited for it.

Besides providing powerful incentives for attack-style campaigning and political gaming, the Two-Choice Tango also deprives voters of political choices, whether a range of political parties and candidates or a range of viewpoints and policy preferences. Despite a recent clamor by voters for more political choices, as evidenced by the successes of independent candidates like Ross Perot, Lowell Weicker (former governor of Connecticut), Angus King (governor of Maine) and Jesse Ventura, third parties have been notoriously unsuccessful in our Winner Take All system. Out of the more than 7,000 state senate and house seats scattered across the United States, five currently are held by third parties, all in Vermont (a fairly constant number, year after year, election after election). Out of 535 Congressional and U.S. Senate seats, only two are held by an independent representative (one each from Vermont and Virginia), and none by third parties. It has always been that way in the United States (and to some degree other Winner Take All democracies as well, such as the aforementioned Great Britain). Out of the approximately 21,000 U. S. House races in the twentieth century, minor party and independent candidates won a mere one hundred times, plus another seven special elections, a total of 107 victories-or about 0.5 percent of the time. That the rate of third party success is as likely explained as a statistical fluke as much as any organic political momentum or alteration of the duopolistic landscape.

There have been over one thousand third parties in our nation's history, but only one has ever lasted-the Republican Party, which replaced in the 1850s one of the two major parties that had been riven apart over the issue of slavery. Most third parties are only a distant memory now, for trivia junkies and TV game shows, but with a small but determined few still buzzing around the American political landscape against all odds. Third parties lose under Winner Take All not because they don't have good ideas or enough campaign resources but because they are a minority perspective competing in a majoritarian Winner Take All system that rewards the highest vote-getters, which, by definition, is not usually a minority. The prospect of wasting your vote on a third-party candidate who doesn't stand a chance or, even worse, voting for a third-party candidate like Ralph Nader who might spoil your "lesser of two evils" candidate and help elect your "greater evil," are powerful disincentives that have always knocked the legs out from under third parties.

The fact is, Winner Take All systems are notoriously hostile to the success and survival of third parties. Consequently, voters have fewer meaningful choices at the polls. Fewer viewpoints and policy options get debated during the campaigns, as the Two-Choice Tango "dumbs down" the quality of campaign debates by using extreme negative campaigning and by preselecting a narrow range of issues for political debate that will appeal to a narrow pool of swing voters in swing districts or swing states. It was telling during the 2000 presidential campaign, which was dominated by a handful of issues, including Medicare, Social Security, and prescription drug benefits for seniors, when one twenty-something commented, "I feel like if you aren't elderly or on Medicare or Social Security, these two candidates have nothing to say to you." As a result of the Two-Choice Tango and the use of the modern campaign technologies, most other policies and issues-and the constituencies interested in them-got left on the sidelines during the campaign.

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According to the National Center for Health Statistics, ten children and adolescents in the United States are killed each and every day by gunfire-nearly 4,000 per year, 86 percent of the firearm deaths for children in the entire world-a level of horror usually expected in death-squad dictatorships like El Salvador or Pinochet's Chile, or in the Taliban's Afghanistan.

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The General Accounting Office, Congress' investigative arm, has released a report claiming the U.S. military was selling old clips of .50 caliber armor-piercing bullets to a private contractor, who then refurbished the clips and sold them to private gun dealers all over the country. More than 100,000 rounds of ammunition designed to pierce tanks, bring down helicopters, and slice through buildings were refurbished and sold by Talon Manufacturing in 1998. The report showed that these shells and the weapons that fire them- long-range sniper weapons-can easily be purchased in gun shops and over the Internet. Indeed, there are fewer legal hurdles to buying sniper weapons than to buying a regular handgun. And while a person has to be eighteen or older to get t his weapon from a licensed dealer-or sixteen to drive an automobile, eighteen to vote, or twenty-one to consume alcohol-there's no penalty whatsoever under federal law and most states' laws for a person who resells their gun secondhand to a kid of any age. The military also auctions off broken semiautomatic weapons to gun dealers and gunsmiths who then put them back together with replacement parts and sell them. M-1 carbines and M-1 Garands can be purchased easily by the average person on the street, who is free to resell them to kids or to people with criminal records. Eric Harris, one of the teenage Littleton assailants, obtained his TEC-DC9 semiautomatic handgun from a friend of a coworker who was over twenty-one, perfectly legal under federal law (although a crime under Colorado law, which was later used to convict the supplier of the Columbine firearms).

No, reviewing our hodgepodge of firearms laws, one would conclude that we are a devout, even fundamentalist, Second Amendment society, with private individuals armed to levels exceeded only by countries like Milosevic's Serbia or the Taliban in Afghanistan. And we have a sorely unresponsive Winner Take All Congress to thank for it. Like our voting machine debacle, our gun-slinging culture has made the United States the butt of jokes around the world. Instead of taking away the guns, our children have to deal with the concentration camp-like specter of metal detector gates at school entrances, video cameras panning the hallways, and flash searches and seizures like a village under siege by an occupying army. Walking into some urban schools today one is reminded of the heavily surveiled "model villages" in Guatemala during the worst years of its murderous regimes, no doubt an intimidating and thuggish atmosphere for an education.

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What if the President of the United States were to go on television and announce to the nation that, starting tomorrow, the United States is switching to a new democracy technology and the results of this change will be the following:

* less than half, often only one-third, of eligible voters will participate in national elections;
* even fewer voters will participate in state and local elections;
* barely a third, often one-quarter, of all voters will cast a vote for a winning candidate;
* about three-quarters of U.S. House races regularly will be won by landslides (at least a 60 to 40 percent margin), and a full 90 percent of House races will be won by noncompetitive ten-point margins (at least 55 to 45 percent);
* state legislative races will be even less competitive than U.S. House races, t with a whopping 40 percent of state legislative races typically uncontested by one of the two major parties;
* despite being primarily a two-party system, about 90 percent of voters will have only one choice of a candidate that has any chance of winning their district seat;
* at least 95 percent of incumbents will be reelected on a regular basis.

If the president announced these to be the results we could expect from this change in democracy technology, how do you think the nation might react? Or imagine if the CEOs of Microsoft or Cisco or any other Fortune 500 corporation announced organizational changes that would produce similar impacts on their bottom line-how do you think their stockholders and boards of directors might react? Most likely there would be an outcry. Yet this profile is exactly the prevailing snapshot of U.S. representative democracy using our antiquated ~ ~ Winner Take All methods and practices.

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Even during America's most important election for President, 100 million voters sat it out. Another 30 million are no-shows during nonpresidential election years.

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... following the 2000 Census, every legislative district in the United States-every city council district, every state legislative and U.S. House district-literally thousands and thousands of districts-automatically expired. By law these geographic districts must all be roughly equal in population, and so the decennial population and demographic shifts reflected by the new Census triggered the expiration of the existing districts. This means that every legislative district had to be redrawn before the next elections in 2002. This linedrawing occurs at the start of every decade, as certain as income taxes and death.

This line-drawing, in many respects, is the defining skirmish of the Winner Take All geographic-based system. Newt Gingrich once said "Redistricting is everything." That's because the impact of this line-drawing is to decide-in advance-the winners and losers of most legislative elections for the next ten years. And guess who is redrawing the lines? Is it panels of fair-minded citizens, making sure that the political and geographic boundaries of their neighborhoods are kept intact? Is it political scientists, armed with reams of data and computer tools to ensure that competition is maximized and that no single political party walks off with the prize? Is it learned judges or independent nonpartisan commissions, deliberating over objective and impartial criteria about what constitutes a fair redistricting? Will the process include public input of those whose votes and trust in government will be most affected?

The answer, in a word, is no.

In fact, contrary to all sense-except the type of sense that has been steeped in the defenses of the status quo-the lines [of legislative districts] are redrawn by none other than the politicians themselves. And these incumbent line-drawers generally are guided by no criteria other than two rather ambitious and self-serving goals: first, to guarantee their own reelection and that of their friends and colleagues; and second, to garner a majority of legislative seats for their political party or faction. When it comes to redistricting, the fox not only guards the hen house, the fox salivates.

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Forget what you've heard about Big Money buying elections-redistricting Winner Take All districts is the political class' slickest sleight of hand, and it descends upon us once a decade like a giant iceberg. Behind closed doors, incumbent politicians, their political parties, and their consultants conduct the decennial ritual of carving up their personal fiefdom, their legislative district. Collectively they jigsaw, jury-rig, and gerrymander their districts down to the neighborhood bloc level. They produce legislative districts whose shapes resemble, in the words of many observers, splattered spaghetti sauce, a squashed mosquito, meandering snakes, dumbbells, earmuffs, starfish, a gnawed wishbone, Bullwinkle the Moose, the "Z" mark of Zorro, and a host of other bewildering shapes that defy description or explanation other than the capricious acts of a powerful class of politicians looking to guarantee themselves lifetime employment and party preeminence.

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Research has shown that, as a result of Winner Take All and its redistricting roulette-not inequities in campaign finances-the vast majority of U.S. House races are so noncompetitive as to be done deals before voters even show up to the polls. To be precise, in the 2000 House elections 91 percent of races were won by comfortable victory margins greater than ten points, and 78 percent were won by landslide margins greater than twenty points (both of these figures include the sixty-five races that were uncontested by a major party). Only thirty-eight seats-less than 9 percent of all House seats-were won by competitive margins of fewer than ten points, the lowest figure in twelve years and second lowest in the past twenty. Like a Soviet-type Politburo, nearly 99 percent of incumbents won reelection, and most legislative elections were reduced to a meaningless charade.

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The monopoly politics of Winner Take All also undermines campaign finance reform. New research is showing that most election results now correlate more closely with whether the gerrymandered districts lean Democrat or Republican than with inequities in campaign finance.

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The simple truth is that, in this new era of computer-driven, precisely gerrymandered districts, campaign contributors will respond to high incumbent re-election rates more than cause them. Donors will give to candidates they know will win because the district has been drawn to produce that result. Besides returning incumbents to office like the sea returns flotsam to the shore, gerrymandering trumps the impact of private money on most legislative elections, hands-down. It is this fact that has allowed the Center for Voting and Democracy to predict the winners in most legislative races eighteen months before the election, without knowing anything about inequities in campaign finance, primarily by correlating the partisan nature of how the districts had been drawn during the i991-92 redistricting process. Using their partisan demographic method of analysis, the Center's executive director Rob Richie confidently predicted in the early '90s, earlier than any other pundit or politico, "The Democrats' edge in House races in the post-New Deal era is over." And he was exactly right. Handicappers at the horse track should be so lucky as to have races as predictable as these.

This is a sea-level change of dramatic proportions, yet hardly anyone is talking about it. Certainly you would never know it by listening to the hype of many national pundits and reformers, still operating under the assumptions of the old paradigm. We still see countless headlines blaring "Money Buys Elections," and reports of the latest record-breaking campaign fundraising figures. For example, following the November 2000 elections, a press release from the Center for Responsive Politics, a leading campaign finance reform think tank, boldly announced: "MONEY WINS BIG IN 2000 ELECTIONS, TOP SPENDERS CAPTURE 9 OUT OF 10 RACES." A headline from a report by California Public Interest Research Group (PIRG), another leading campaign finance reform organization, blared "MONEY LARGELY DETERMINES ELECTION OUTCOMES." Sure, the top spenders did in fact capture nine out of ten races, but these sorts of headlines confuse cause with effect: winners have more money to spend because donors know in advance which candidate is going to win. Most districts have been gerrymandered to produce that result. So donors are smartly placing their money on the winners. They are buying access, not elections-an important distinction.

While it is important to track information like relative campaign spending, this kind of hyperbole posing as analysis completely conflates reality and confuses the role that the Winner Take All system plays in creating safe, noncompetitive legislative districts. The intersection between money and votes is complex, but it can be understood best when you realize that incumbents are essentially CEOs of their own small businesses, dedicated to the expansion of their political fortunes. Yet unlike businesses in the free market, most incumbents have a monopoly on their market because they decide who their consumers, i.e., voters, will be, via the redistricting process. Once the district lines are set, the incumbents have a political monopoly over their political fortunes.

Under the new paradigm, where money will matter most is in the party primaries of the party that dominates each district. That will be the real battleground for deciding who wins and loses most legislative elections. But first the primaries need candidates-63 percent of incumbents' primaries were uncontested in 199S, presumably because the benefits of incumbency (widespread name recognition, contacts and "buddyship" with establishment leaders, editors, and the like, and the ability to raise gobs of money if needed for a close race) scare off challengers. In the handful of races for the primaries of open seats, better-financed candidates will have an advantage since voters won't have the benefit of party labels to guide them, and usually none of the candidates have sufficient name recognition. For the small number of contested races that are close, better-financed candidates may gain a few percentage points that could prove to be the margin of victory. But the number of close races is fewer and fewer every year-less than 9 percent of House races in the 2000 election.

So here is yet another befuddling paradox of our Winner Take All system: although most races are decidedly noncompetitive, often even uncontested, ~) because of the lopsided partisan composition of the districts, the stakes each congressional cycle still can be huge because only a handful of races will determine which political party will win a majority in the U.S. House or many of the fifty state legislatures. With the major parties so evenly divided, hundreds of millions of dollars will be raised and spent as Democrats and Republicans joust for control, targeting the undecided swing voters in those district with slick campaign mailers and thirty-second TV spots. Says Burdett Loomis, a political scientist at the University of Kentucky, "A lot of money will flow to a relative handful of seats. In those seats, it's nuclear war. Twenty miles away, there's nothing."

This paradox produces a certain schizophrenia in the national psyche. Voters see headline after headline screaming about all the hundreds of millions of dollars that are spent on our elections, about the Democrats and Republicans holding gold-plated fundraisers, raising money from the same corporate clients in the incessant drive to compete. Things certainly sound competitive, and politics certainly appear bought and sold by big money donors, even as most voters' experience is that of living in safe, one-party districts. From the individual voter's point of view, politics is a wash, a remote game that does not involve them, nor consequently interest them; but from the Democrats' and Republicans' points of view, every dollar and every swing voter count.

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Professor Douglas Amy, political scientist

Redistricting makes the inequities in campaign financing even worse. Most elections are so non-competitive due to how the lines are drawn that big donors already know who's going to win. So they give to the likely winners to curry favor.

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The Republican House leadership decided to hinge the reward of leadership positions and chairmanships of powerful committees to those incumbents who raised the most "soft money" for the party (money raised for a political party is called "soft money," as opposed to "hard money," which is raised directly for an individual candidate). Since committee chairs have near-dictatorial powers to set committee dockets, dole out pork, and establish the national agenda, this quid pro quo debased government to a whole new level of crassness and political patronage. What's more, the Republican leadership was able to do this because most incumbents don't need a lot of money for their own reelections. Most incumbents live in safe, noncompetitive districts where they have about as much chance of losing as a snowball melting at the North Pole.

So Speaker Dennis Hastert twisted the arms of these safe-seat Republicans to raise money they didn't need, demanding that they hand over the surplus cash to himself and other party leaders. The leadership then was able to target this soft money like a laser to the three dozen close races that were about to decide control of the U.S. House and Senate. As New York Times columnist Gail Collins put it, "The Speaker of the House has already told Republican incumbents to raise money for those [vulnerable] candidates or risk being transferred to the Subcommittee on Toxic Waste."

As early as June 1999, seventeen months before the next congressional election, ultraconservative House Majority Whip Tom DeLay (R-Texas) had handed over $100,000 each to his party's ten most vulnerable House members. DeLay is a prodigious fundraiser, raising millions of dollars for congressional elections, which is conspicuous not only because of the sheer size of his personal war chest but also because as a right-wing Republican representing an overwhelmingly conservative Texas district, he regularly wins with 70 percent of the vote. DeLay does not need to spend a dime to win reelection. But his safe seat allows him to raise millions and dispense it to colleagues, thereby gaining their support when the Republican caucus elects him to its coveted party Whip position, just two steps below the Speaker.

Not to be outdone, the Democrats engage in similar practices, with Democratic House leader Dick Gephardt and others paving the way. During the 2000 election cycle Gephardt personally raised $37 million for the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC), equaling the total the DCCC raised during the entire 1998 campaign. Gephardt also campaigned for sixty Democrats in thirty-five states, generating another $5.5 million for their campaigns. San Francisco Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi was conspicuous in raising millions of dollars for her congressional race to win an overwhelmingly liberal San Francisco district that she regularly wins with 80 percent of the vote. Pelosi is another of the many House members that do not need to spend a dime to win reelection, but Pelosi was visible on the other side of the aisle from DeLay, dispensing money to colleagues in tight races in a bid to buy their support when the Democratic Party caucus voted for party leadership positions. As a "soft money queen," Pelosi managed to gain enough colleagues' support to win election to the powerful party whip position.

A new "soft money king" on the block is Rep. Patrick Kennedy (D-Rhode Island), famous Kennedy scion. He was made chair of the DCCC because he had become prodigious at trading off his family name and scaring Newt-hating liberals into ponying up big bucks. Kennedy brought the mystique and glitz of one of America's premier political families to the rough-and-tumble job of financing the party's drive to reclaim a House majority. He rewarded big donors with visits to the dynasty's fabled compound in Hyannis Port, Massachusetts, and entertained others at the grand oceanfront mansions of Newport, Rhode Island, that are part of his congressional district. He proudly invoked his legendary uncles, John and Robert, "to help pry open wallets in circles where the Kennedy name still sizzles."

The DCCC and its GOP counterpart were the centers of action in the fight for the House, modern-day equivalents of the old-fashioned political machine. Both committees not only raised record sums of soft money, but they also targeted the money to the right districts and recruited candidates, even trying to anoint the party's nominees in certain contested party primaries. But while both parties regularly engage in such shenanigans, House Republicans in 1999 raised the bar and further debased politics by publicly and unapologetically hinging these fund-raising efforts to the awarding of leadership positions and committee chairs. The corruptive effects of such a crass quid pro quo on our democracy are obvious. Most legislative elections can't be bought because they already are too lopsided and noncompetitive because of redistricting and natural partisan demographics to even need to be bought. But the geographic basis of Winner Take All and its basic measuring unit, single-seat districts, allows safe-seat politicians to raise money far beyond their own needs, and then dole it out in such a way as to create their own political machines-yet another gaming of the system.

A comparison of congressional campaign spending trends from 1992 through 2000 reflects this change of strategy predicated on the tactical partition of the Winner Take All political map into competitive races versus noncompetitive races. As this strategy of targeting money away from safe incumbents and toward close races has taken hold, the median amount spent per race went from being greatest in incumbents' races to greatest in races for open seats. In fact, the median amount spent by incumbents rose only 25 percent throughout the 1990s-barely keeping pace with inflation, but it rose 140 percent-nearly six times as much as incumbents' spending-for open seat races. Which makes sense, given the realities of the Winner Take All political landscape, where party leaders strategize over the political map like military generals, figuring out which will be the close races and where to sprinkle the most resources. The Soft Money Kings disproportionately pour money into the handful of close races.

This amounts to further confirmation that the role of money in politics is not as determinative as some make it out to be. If it were true that "money buys elections," the Republican leadership would not be able to shake down their Republican incumbents to steer money to the close races, nor would they want to, because these incumbents would need that money for their own reelections. That would be robbing Peter to elect Paul. But the reality is no matter how much money opponents raise in these)carefully crafted safe districts, their chances of beating the candidate from the dominant party are about as good as hitting the lottery.

Instead, the more complicated and nuanced reality of Winner Take All politics has created a fund-raising pecking order in which the "Captains of Cash" are rewarded for raising excess funds that are handed off to colleagues in closer races. This is how political machines and fiefdoms are created and maintained, with all their progenies of patronage, logrolling, and pork-doling. Such political juggernauts, rightly targeted for reform of soft money abuses by the McCain-Feingold legislation, are wholly a byproduct of the geographic-based Winner Take All system, and the dynamics unleashed by that system. The Captains of Cash and Soft Money Kings (and occasional Queens) sit atop the soft money pile, dispensing favors and collecting fealty, both within their own personal "safe" districts and within the legislature, and then sprinkle their booty around to targeted races, buying themselves higher ranking in the party pecking order.

Here then, is the explanation to the seeming paradox of thousands of noncompetitive safe seats swimming in a sea of soft money and campaign millions- the battle is not for reelection, since most legislators are easily reelected. The real war being waged is for control of the Legislature and for all the perks and power that come with it, such as control of legislative committees and personal clout for individual Members who are appointed chairs of committees and subcommittees. And for that effort party leaders raise gobs of soft money and sprinkle it around, calling the shots. The geographic-based nature of our Winner Take All system combined with the Redistricting Roulette define this pyramidal shape to our political landscape and permit this kind of gaming and manipulation to go on. The fundamental noncompetitive nature of most Winner Take A11 district races acts as a kind of lens that collects money from all over the country and focuses it on a few races where it can have overwhelming impact. This dynamic is much more distorting of our democracy than simply "money buying elections," since it concentrates and concatenates power in a small number of hands and Rolodexes.

Especially at a time when control of the U.S. House is likely to hang in the balance each election for the foreseeable future, it means that a handful of political leaders like DeLay, Armey, Gephardt, Frost, Pelosi, Kennedy, Hastert, and the like will be able to maintain their own well-oiled political machines, putting partisan and personality politics above sound policy and the national interest. It means that donors will be placing their bets with candidates they know will win, because the Winner Take All districts have been drawn to produce that result. Rather than buying elections, donors will be buying access to and influence of legislative leaders ...

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... the decennial redistricting of geographic-based, single-seat districts and its aftermath greatly define our political landscape. Incumbent legislators and party bosses of the two major political parties use sophisticated computers and comprehensive demographic and polling data to render 90 percent of single-seat districts into noncompetitive, essentially one-party fiefdoms, where most incumbent politicians and parties are virtually guaranteed victory, usually with landslide victory margins. The representation of millions of voters for the next decade rested in the hands of thousands of state legislators who decided redistricting, over 40 percent of whom ran uncontested-no challenger from the other major party-even as they received millions of dollars in donations that skirted federal law from congressional incumbents looking to protect their own seats. Party leaders-the Soft Money Kings and Queens-have created a pyramidal structure of political machines that raises tens of millions of dollars of surplus "soft money" that is steered to the few close races that, paradoxically, will decide which party wins control of many state legislatures and the Congress ...

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What is unique about the unrepresentativeness of the U.S. Senate is that it bestows equal representation-two Senators-to all states no matter how small their population, drastically underrepresenting states with larger populations. The U.S. Senate was originally designed by the Framers as a compromise to settle the Big State versus Little State controversy, and the result was that low-population states like Thurmond's South Carolina have been handed a "representation quota," a kind of affirmative action for political representation. Which is ironic, considering that affirmative action for racial representation used in the House-the drawing of minority-opportunity districts-is underjudicial and political siege.

Consider: more than one-quarter of the United States population now lives in three very large, rapidly growing states-California, Texas, and Florida, which also happen to be three of our most racially diverse states-yet they are represented by only six out of one hundred Senators. A mere 7 percent of the total United States population, on the other hand, resides in the seventeen least popular states and is represented by thirty-four Senators, sufficient to kill any treaties or constitutional amendments. Texas, with 21 million people, has the same representation as Montana, with less than 1 million people. A Senator from Rhode Island represents 500,000 residents, while a Senator from New York represents over 9 million. California has sixty-eight times as many people as Wyoming, yet these states have the same representation in the U.S. Senate- Los Angeles County, with nearly 10 million people, has a higher population than forty-two states. According to author Michael Lind, today half of the Senate can be elected by 15 percent of the American people, and just over 10 percent can elect a filibuster-proof 41 percent of the Senate. By filibustering. Senators representing little more than one-tenth of the nation can block reforms supported by the House, the President, and their fellow Senators, who represent the other 90 percent of the country.

Given current demographic and migration trends, by 2050 as few as 5 percent of the population may have majority power in the Senate. Clearly this is c demographic meltdown in the making. By contrast, in 1789 when the first senators took the oath of office, the ratio between the most populous state (Virginia' and the least populous one (Delaware) was 11 to 1, and it took a minimum of 3C percent of the national population to assemble a Senate majority .. the Founders and Framers simply did not foresee such dramatic population imbalances two hundred years later. The alarming trajectory is toward one of an ever more flagrant form of microminority rule. There is nothing "majoritarian" about the United States Senate. These are demographic changes that our two-hundred-year-old constitutional structures are ill prepared to handle. Indeed the U.S. Senate is in the running for the least representative legislature among Western democracies, outside the aristocratic British House of Lords (which is in the process of being substantially reformed).

Political scientist Robert Dahl, with his usual gift for clarifying what other have made muddy, put it this way:

Imagine a situation in which your vote for your representative is counted as one while the vote of a friend in a neighboring town is counted as seventeen. Suppose that for some reason you and your friend each change your jobs and your residence. As a result of your new job, you move to your friend's town. For the same reason, your friend moves to your town. Presto! To your immense gratification you now discover that simply by moving, you have acquired sixteen more votes. Your friend, on the other hand, has lost sixteen votes. Pretty ridiculous, is it not? Yet that is about what would happen if you lived on the western shore of Lake Tahoe in California and moved less than 50 miles east to Carson City, Nevada, while a friend in Carson City moved to your community on Lake Tahoe.

The eventual destination of this trajectory will be political bantustans where high-population and racially diverse states will have barely any representation in the nearly all-white, all-male Senate.

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... "the only Americans whose views are consistently magnified by Senate malapportionment are white, rural, right-wing isolationists. If you are nonwhite or of mixed race, if you live in a major metropolitan area, if you are liberal or centrist, if you support an internationalist foreign policy, or even if you are a conservative who lives in a populous state,'' you are being shortchanged by the representation quota-the affirmative action-bestowed upon low-population states in the U.S. Senate. Tom Geoghegan, commenting in a 1994 article in the New Republic about the Senate's proclivity to vote down progressive reforms, wrote, "We can't raise our wages. We can't get health insurance. No aid to the cities. And why? The Senate votes it down. By a weighted vote, for small-town whites in pickup trucks with gun racks all out there shooting these things down.''

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Because of the Senate's unique constitutional role in screening executive and judicial appointees and approving treaties, this thoroughly unrepresentative body has a powerful influence on all three branches of government, as well as on foreign policy. The fact that the Republican Party has benefited since 1958 from this representation subsidy speaks volumes about why the U.S. Supreme Court has been so conservative for at least the past quarter century.

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The Electoral College and U.S. Senate are like ticking time bombs, waiting to explode. In our twenty-first century multiracial, multipartisan, and multicultural nation, the built-in representation quotas for low-population, conservative, and predominantly white states in both the Electoral College and the United States Senate point inevitably toward a constitutional and racial clash. The situation is very much like the British system in the eighteenth century, which became known as a "rotten borough" system because, in the absence of reapportionment, semi-abandoned rural towns continued to "elect" members of Parliament while newly burgeoning cities did not. Similarly, European immigrants in crowded American cities during the nineteenth century were obstructed electorally by rural Anglo-Protestant "rotten boroughs" with sparse inhabitants who dominated malapportioned state legislatures. Eventually the undemocratic nature of these statutory defects was uncovered and abolished.

But the "rotten-borough" U.S. Senate and Electoral College, and their representation quotas for low-population states, remain largely unexamined, even as the inequality grows worse. Burgeoning Hispanic and Asian populations who tend to live in the largest states, as well as blacks also living in these states, will recognize how their votes are being diluted by the "rotten borough" of the Senate and Electoral College. With our nation evolving toward a multiracial amalgam without historical precedent, the Senate and presidency will continue to look like white rural America. Shifting demographics are colliding with antiquated, eighteenth-century, anti-democratic defects implanted into our constitutional institutions. Like I have said in other places in this book, almost sounding like a refrain: this is a demographic built to blow.

Looking ahead, the question is whether the Senate and our presidential election methods will enter the twentieth century sometime during the twenty-first. Most legislatures, not only in the U.S. but also around the world, base representation on population-that is, on some semblance of proportional representation, that a legislature should, in some fashion, represent and reflect "the people." This is a principle that many popular revolutions and struggles have fought and died for, wresting this sacred democratic principle from kings, dictators, and tyrants. It is a sound principle, and one that our American democracy proudly exported to the rest of the world, so many years ago. But in the United States, ironically, this principle still awaits fulfillment; today, it must be wrested from the special interests of low-population and predominantly conservative white states that benefit from the defective Senate and Electoral College established by the Framers.

Most alarmingly, given what is at stake, it will be very difficult to reform our antiquated practices. That is because the very states that benefit from this affirmative action essentially have veto power over constitutional amendments that require support from two-thirds of the Senate and three-fourths of the state legislatures. In addition, Article V of the U.S. Constitution says that individual states must give their permission to be deprived of equal representation in the Senate: "No State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate." And Article IV, Section 3, provides that no state can "be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress." Not one, but two poison pill provisions, in addition to the difficulties of passing constitution amendments.


Fixing Elections

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