The Paradox of American Democracy

excerpted from the book

The Paradox of American Democracy

by John B. Judis

Routledge Press, 2001, paper

p4
[A] school of thought, composed of populists and Marxists, held that important government decisions were shaped and then made by a small, interlocking group of business, political, and military leaders who prevailed regardless of who won elections. Populists described this group as a "power elite" or "establishment" and Marxists called it a "ruling class."

p10
During the I980s, Washingtonians began to refer to the city's array of trade associations, law firms, and public relations firms as "K Street," after the boulevard on or around which many of the firms had their offices.

The development of K Street was by no means inevitable and has not been replicated in Western Europe or Japan. It was spurred initially by the success of progressives, populists, and business leaders in weakening the political parties. Interest groups filled a vacuum left by the declining power of the political parties. In the I8705, farmers, angered by tight money, formed parties; by the 19205, farmers, threatened by falling prices, formed national organizations and lobbies. K Street was also made possible by the peculiar way in which the American regulatory state developed. In other countries, state bureaucracies, staffed by civil servants, had authority to make rules and final judgments on complex issues involving business, labor, and consumers. During the 19305, American public officials in regulatory agencies wielded this kind of power, but after a ten-year battle, businesses, aided by the American Bar Association, persuaded Congress to pass the Administrative Procedure Act in 1946, which made regulatory rulings subject to hearings and then judicial review. The act helped turn the regulatory apparatus into a mini-court and led to the proliferation of lawyers and lobbyists in Washington. From I960 to I987, public expenditure on lawyers increased sixfold, and the share of gross national product going to legal services doubled. By I987 the legal industry had become larger than the auto or steel industries.

p12
Political scientist E. Pendelton Herring in I929

"The men who seek special favors of Congress rely almost exclusively upon the manipulation of public sentiment.... they attempt to make the legislators think that the thing they want is the thing the public wants."

p15
University of California sociologist G. William Domhoff

" the corporate elite . . . form the controlling core of the power elite. The interests and unity of the power elite [C. Wright Mills] are thus determined primarily by the interests of the corporate rich."

[Domhoff described how Mills's power elite actually influenced legislation and politics through forming policy groups, think tanks, and foundations.]

Paradox of American Democracy

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