
Alan Dershowitz page

Descent Into Moral Barbarism
Should Alan Dershowitz Target Himself for Assassination?
by NormanFinkelstein
www.zmag.org, August 16, 2006
As Israel's military bravely fires away
shells and missiles to lay waste the fragile human and physical
infrastructure of Lebanon, Harvard Law Professor Alan Dershowitz,
waging battle on a second front to legitimize Israel's criminal
aggression, bravely fires away op-eds from his foxhole at Martha's
Vineyard to lay waste the fragile infrastructure of international
law. These are but the latest salvoes in Dershowitz's long and
distinguished career of apologetics on behalf of his Holy State.
Since becoming a born-again Zionist after
the June 1967 war Dershowitz has justified each and all of Israel's
egregious violations of international law. In recent years he
has used the "war on terrorism" as a springboard for
a full frontal assault on this body of law. Appearing shortly
after the outbreak of the second intifada, his book Why Terrorism
Works (2002) served to rationalize Israel's brutal repression
of the uprising. In 2006 Dershowitz published a companion volume,
Preemption: A Knife that Cuts Both Ways, to justify Israel's preventive
use of force against Iran. It is painfully clear from their content
that Dershowitz possesses little knowledge or for that matter
interest in the timely political topics that purport to be the
stimuli for his interventions. In reality each book is keyed to
a current Israeli political crisis and seeks to rationalize the
most extreme measures for resolving it. If Why Terrorism Works
used the war on terrorism as a juggernaut to set back the clock
on protection of civilians from occupying armies, Preemption uses
the war on terrorism to set back the clock on the protection of
states from wars of aggression. Dershowitz's current missives
from Martha's Vineyard take aim at the protection of civilians
in times of war.
The central premise of Dershowitz is that
"international law, and those who administer it, must understand
that the old rules" do not apply in the unprecedented war
against a ruthless and fanatical foe, and that "the laws
of war and the rules of morality must adapt to these [new] realities."
This is not the first time such a rationale has been invoked to
dispense with international law. According to Nazi ideology, ethical
conventions couldn't be applied in the case of "Jews or Bolsheviks;
their method of political warfare is entirely amoral." On
the eve of the "preventive war" against the Soviet Union,
Hitler issued the Commissar Order, which mandated the summary
execution of Soviet political commissars and Jews, and set the
stage for the Final Solution. He justified the order targeting
them for assassination on the ground that the Judeo-Bolsheviks
represented a fanatical ideology, and that in these "exceptional
conditions" civilized methods of warfare had to be cast aside:
In the fight against Bolshevism it must
not be expected that the enemy will act in accordance with the
principles of humanity or international lawany attitude of consideration
or regard for international law in respect of these persons is
an errorThe protagonists of barbaric Asiatic methods of warfare
are the political commissars. Accordingly if captured in battle
or while resisting, they should in principle be shot.
It was simultaneously alleged that the
Red Army commissars (who were assimilated to Jews) qualified neither
as prisoners of war protected by the Geneva Convention nor civilians
entitled to trial before military courts, but rather were in effect
illegal combatants. Plus ça change, plus c'est la même
chose.
It is similarly instructive that, although
Dershowitz is represented, and represents himself, in the media
as a liberal and civil libertarian, the sort of arguments he makes
crops up most often at the far right of the political spectrum.
For example, in the recent landmark decision Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,
the Supreme Court found that the petitioner, a Yemeni national
captured in Afghanistan and held in Guantanamo Bay, was entitled,
under both domestic statute and international law, to minimum
standards of a fair trial, which the Commission Order, setting
the guidelines for military commissions, didn't meet. A centerpiece
of Judge Clarence Thomas's dissent was that "rules developed
in the context of conventional warfare" were no longer applicable
because _ quoting President Bush _ "the war against terrorism
ushers in a new paradigm" and "this new paradigmrequires
new thinking in the law of war." Inasmuch as "we are
not engaged in a traditional battle with a nation-state,"
he went on to argue, the Court's decision "would sorely hamper
the President's ability to confront and defeat a new and deadly
enemy." It's hard to know where Thomas (and Bush) ends and
Dershowitz begins.
The main thrust of Preemption is to justify
an Israeli assault on Iran's nuclear facilities. Although the
book purports to the lofty goal of constructing a jurisprudence
for criminal intent prior to commission of an actual crime, Dershowitz's
range of historical reference is pretty much limited to the Bible
and Israel, and it is plainly not the Bible that is uppermost
in his mind. To justify the Israeli assault on Iran Dershowitz
sets up Israel's attack on Egypt in June 1967 as the paradigm
of legitimate preemptive war and its attack on Iraq's nuclear
reactor in 1981 as the paradigm of legitimate preventive war.
His argument seems to be that if the legitimacy of the June 1967
attack is beyond dispute and the legitimacy of the 1981 attack
has come to be seen as beyond dispute, then the legitimacy of
a preventive war against Iran should also be beyond dispute.
Before analyzing this argument it is instructive
to look at the current legal consensus on preemptive and preventive
war. Dershowitz asserts that an "accepted jurisprudence"
doesn't exist. In fact, however, there is an enduring consensus,
which recent events haven't shaken. In 2004 a high-level U.N.
panel commissioned by the Secretary-General published its report
on combating challenges to global security in the 21st century.
The report reaffirmed the conventional understanding of Article
51 of the U.N. Charter, which prohibits the unilateral use of
force by a State except to ward off an "armed attack"
or if a "threatened attack is imminent, no other means would
deflect it and the action is proportionate" (emphasis in
original), the latter commonly denoted preemptive use of force.
The report went on to prohibit the unilateral use of force by
a State to ward off an inchoate armed attack, or what's commonly
denoted preventive use of force, reaffirming that the Security
Council is the sole legitimate forum for sanctioning the use of
force in such a circumstance. "For those impatient with such
a response," it explained, the answer must be that, in a
world full of perceived potential threats, the risk to the global
order and the norm of non-intervention on which it continues to
be based is simply too great for the legality of unilateral preventive
action, as distinct from collectively endorsed action, to be accepted.
Allowing one to so act is to allow all.
Although Dershowitz puts forth Israel's
attack on Egypt in June 1967 as the paradigm of preemptive use
of force, both as a matter of fact and theory this claim is patently
untenable. The scholarly consensus is that an Egyptian armed attack
was not imminent while it is far from certain that diplomatic
options had been exhausted when Israel struck. Dershowitz himself
acknowledges that "it is not absolutely certain" that
Egypt would have attacked, and that "Nasser may not have
intended to attack." He finesses this with the assertion
that Israeli leaders "reasonably believed" that an Egyptian
attack was "imminent and potentially catastrophic."
Yet, apart from some transparently self-serving public statements
there isn't a scratch of evidence to sustain this claim either.
Again, Dershowitz himself cites (in an endnote) the acknowledgment
of former Prime Minister Begin, who was a member of the National
Unity government in June 1967, that Israel "had a choice.
The Egyptian Army concentrations in the Sinai do not prove that
Nasser was really about to attack us. We must be honest with ourselves.
We decided to attack him." Even if for argument's sake it
were true that Israeli leaders honestly erred, how can resort
to preemptive force on the mistaken belief that an attack was
imminent constitute the paradigm of legitimate use of preemption
_ or, to use Dershowitz's coinage, how can a "false positive"
be the paradigmatic case? Rather the contrary, if June 1967 were
the paradigm of preemption, it would undercut the legitimacy of
any such resort to force. Dershowitz seems not to be aware that
he has made a case not for but against preemptive war.
Dershowitz next nominates Israel's attack
on the Iraqi nuclear reactor as "paradigmatic" of legitimate
use of preventive force. He mounts his case from multiple angles,
sometimes implicitly, sometimes explicitly, but always falsely.
In the first instance, Dershowitz puts preemptive war at one pole
of a continuum and preventive war at the opposite pole. Although
asserting that "the distinction between preventive and preemptive
military action is important," and that there are "real
differences between these concepts," he more often than not
uses the terms interchangeably. For instance, he goes back and
forth depicting the 1981 Israeli attack on Iraq's nuclear reactor
and the 2003 U.S. attack on Iraq both as preemptive and preventive
uses of force. By collapsing the distinction between them, whereby
not even a flea's hop separates the two poles on his continuum,
Dershowitz in effect legitimizes preventive war as preemptive
war by another name. In like manner he redefines preemption so
as to include preventive use of force: "preemption is widely,
if not universally, regarded as a proper option for a nation operating
under the rule of law, at least in some circumstances _ for example,
when a threat is catastrophic and relatively certain, though nonimminent."
If this is preemption, one wonders what prevention would be.
In addition, although acknowledging that
the U.N. panel explicitly ruled out preventive use of force, Dershowitz
nonetheless maintains that it has come to be seen as legitimate.
To demonstrate this he alleges that Israel's attack on Iraq's
nuclear reactor has become recognized as "the proper and
proportional example of anticipatory self-defense in the nuclear
age" and "the paradigm for proportional, reasonable,
and lawful preventive action" in the "emerging jurisprudence
of preventive military actions," notwithstanding the "lack
of imminence and certainty" of the Iraqi threat to Israel.
He bases this resounding conclusion on a recent article in Foreign
Affairs which "would certainly seem to have justified Israel's
bombing of the Osirak reactor." Plainly the import of the
U.N. panel's findings pales by comparison.
Finally, invoking a philosopher's wisdom
that "no one law governs all things," Dershowitz maintains
that although preventive war might be illegitimate for all other
States it remains a legitimate option for Israel. This is because
the U.N., which is the court of last appeal for inchoate armed
threats, is biased against it. Accordingly, unlike all other States,
Israel cannot be held accountable to international law or, put
otherwise, international law might apply to everyone else but
it doesn't apply to Israel: "it cannot expect the United
Nations to protect it from enemy attack, andwith regard to international
law and international organizations, it lives in a state of nature."
To demonstrate the U.N.'s inveterate hostility to Israel, Dershowitz
specifically cites "Russia's and China's veto power"
in the Security Council, which has allegedly blocked action supportive
of it. Yet, not once in the past 20 years has Russia or China
used the veto for a Security Council resolution bearing on Israel.
On the other hand, the U.S. has exercised its veto power 23 times
in just the past two decades (1986-2006) in support of Israel.
Moreover, due to the U.S. veto Israel has been shielded from any
U.N. sanctions, although the Security Council has imposed them
on 15 member States since 1990, often for violations of international
law identical to those committed by Israel. Not for the first
time Dershowitz has turned reality on its head.
On a related note Dershowitz correctly
observes that Israel "was not condemned by the Security Council"
in June 1967, although its resort to force violated the U.N. Charter,
an armed Egyptian attack having been neither actual nor imminent.
The Security Council and General Assembly were both divided on
how to adjudicate responsibility for the war. This would seem
to suggest that far from being an inherently hostile forum, the
U.N. has in fact granted Israel special dispensations. More generally,
as former Israeli Foreign Minister Shlomo Ben-Ami observes, it
was Israel's policy of creeping annexation that shifted world
opinion against it:
Neither in 1948 nor in 1967 was Israel
subjected to irresistible international pressure to relinquish
her territorial gains because her victory was perceived as the
result of a legitimate war of self-defense. But the international
acquiescence created by Israel's victory in 1967 was to be extremely
short-lived. When the war of salvation and survival turned into
a war of conquest and settlement, the international community
recoiled and Israel went on the defensive. She has remained there
ever since.
Insofar as the professed goal of Dershowitz's
book is not descriptive but normative _ i.e., to devise ideal
laws and institutional arrangements for combating terrorism _
it is curious that he doesn't propose reconfiguring the Security
Council to mitigate its alleged bias. In this regard another of
his claims merits attention: "The UN report fails to address
the situation confronting a democracy with a just claim that is
unable to secure protection from the Security Council and that
reasonably concludes that failing to act unilaterally will pose
existential dangers to its citizens." Yet, the High-level
panel report explicitly addresses this concern and devotes one
of its four parts specifically to proposals for reforming the
Security Council as well as other U.N. institutions, noting preliminarily
that:
One of the reasons why States may want
to bypass the Security Council is a lack of confidence in the
quality and objectivity of its decision-making.But the solution
is not to reduce the Council to impotence and irrelevance: it
is to work from within to reform itnot to find alternatives to
the Security Council as a source of authority but to make the
Council work better than it has.
The reason Dershowitz prefers to shunt
aside the Security Council rather than reform it is not hard to
find: it is difficult to conceive any configuration of the Security
Council that would sanction Israel's periodic depredations of
neighboring Arab countries. Finally, Dershowitz justifies ignoring
the Security Council's strictures on the use of preventive force
because its "anachronistic, mid-twentieth century view of
international law" doesn't take into account the threat posed
by "nuclear annihilation." It seems he forgot about
the Cold War.
Apart from the alleged biases of the U.N.,
Dershowitz defends Israel's unilateral right to prevent its neighbors
from acquiring nuclear weapons apparently on the ground that conventional
nuclear deterrence strategy is anchored in the mutually implied
threat of inflicting massive civilian casualties. However Israel's
neighbors know, according to him, that it would never indiscriminately
target civilian population centers. Lest there be any doubt on
this score he quotes former Prime Minister Begin, "That is
our morality." As Lebanese civilians witnessed for themselves
in 1982, and have witnessed again in 2006 from the "most
moral army in the world" (Prime Minister Olmert).
The indefeasible right of Israel to wage
war as it pleases would seem to grant it very broad license: if
there's just "five percent likelihood" that Israel might
face a compelling threat in "ten years," according to
Dershowitz, it has the right to attack now, and apparently regardless
of whether this potential threat emanates from a currently friendly
state. This would seem to mean that no place in the world is safe
from an Israeli attack at any moment. In Dershowitz's mind, this
is the essence of a realistic and moral jurisprudence on war.
_***
Since the outbreak of hostilities between
Israel and Lebanon in July 2006, Dershowitz has used the war on
terrorism to target yet another branch of international law, the
protection of civilians during armed conflict. Before analyzing
his allegations, it is necessary to look first at the factual
picture.
In early August Human Rights Watch (HRW)
released a comprehensive report devoted mainly to Israel's violations
of the laws of war during the first two weeks of the conflict.
Its main findings were these: over 500 Lebanese had been killed,
overwhelmingly civilians, and up to 5,000 homes damaged or destroyed;
"in dozens of attacks, Israeli forces struck an area with
no apparent military target"; Israel attacked "both
individual vehicles and entire convoys of civilians who heeded
the Israeli warnings to abandon their villages" as well as
"humanitarian convoys and ambulances" that were "clearly
marked," while none "of the attacks on vehiclesresulted
in Hezbollah casualties or the destruction of weapons"; "in
some casesIsraeli forces deliberately targeted civilians";
"no cases [were found] in which Hezbollah deliberately used
civilians as shields to protect them from retaliatory IDF attack";
"on some limited occasions, Hezbollah fighters have attempted
to store weapons near civilian homes and have fired rockets from
areas where civilians live." The "pattern of attacks
during the Israeli offensive," HRW concluded, "indicate[s]
the commission of war crimes."
Contrariwise, Dershowitz has repeatedly
alleged in numerous op-ed pieces that Israel typically takes "extraordinary
steps to minimize civilian casualties," while Hezbollah's
typical tactics were to "live among civilians, hide their
missiles in the homes of civilians, fire them at civilian targets
from densely populated areas, and then use civilians as human
shields against counterattacks." He adduces no evidence to
substantiate these claims, all of which are flatly contradicted
by HRW's findings. In addition, Dershowitz juxtaposes the "indisputable
reality" that "Israel uses pinpoint intelligence and
smart bombs in an effortto target the terrorists" against
Hezbollah which "targets Israeli population centers with
anti-personnel bombs that spray thousands of pellets of shrapnel
in an effort to maximize casualties." Yet, HRW has documented
Israel's use in populated areas of artillery-fired cluster munitions
with a "wide dispersal pattern" that "makes it
very difficult to avoid civilian casualties" and a "high
failure rate" such that they "injure and kill civilians
even after the attack is over." Finally, Dershowitz deplores
not only the actions of Hezbollah but also of "the U.N. peacekeepers
on the Lebanese border [who] have turned out to be collaborators
with Hezbollah." Shouldn't he get some credit for a job well
done after Israel killed four of these "collaborators"
in a deliberate attack on a U.N. compound?
The "new kind of warfare" in
the "age of terrorism," according to Dershowitz, underscores
the "absurdity and counterproductive nature of current international
law." He claims, for example, that this body of law "fails"
to address contingencies such as the firing of missiles "from
civilian population centers." International law "must
be changed," he intones, and "it must become a war crime
to fire rockets from civilian population centers and then hide
among civilians," while those using human shields should
incur full and exclusive responsibility for "foreseeable"
deaths in the event of an attack. Yet, such a scenario is hardly
new and the law has hardly been silent on it: use of civilians
as a shield from attack is a war crime, but it is also a war crime
to disregard totally the presence of civilians even if they are
being used as a shield. Dershowitz further declares that "it
should, of course, already be a war crime for terrorists to target
civilians from anywhere." It of course already is a war crime.
He alleges, however, that "you wouldn't know it by listening
to statements from some U.N. leaders and 'human rights' groups."
Isn't his real beef, however, that they don't only denounce the
targeting of civilians by "terrorists" but the targeting
of civilians by states as well?
International law, Dershowitz alleges,
is based on "old rules _ written when uniformed armies fought
other uniformed armies on a battlefield far away from cities"
_ whereas nowadays "well-armed terrorist armies" like
Hezbollah "don't belong to regular armies and easily blend
into civilian populations" that "recruit, finance, harbor
and facilitate their terrorism." But these conditions are
scarcely novel. In his writings Dershowitz often cites Michael
Walzer's 1977 study Just and Unjust Wars. He surely knows, then,
that Walzer devotes the chapter on guerrilla war to these issues.
Consider this passage:
If you want to fight against us, the guerrillas
say, you are going to have to fight civilians for you are not
at war with an army, but with a nation.In fact, the guerrillas
mobilize only a small part of the nation.They depend upon the
counter-attacks of their enemies to mobilize the rest. Their strategy
is framed in terms of the war convention: they seek to place the
onus of indiscriminate warfare on the opposing army.Now, every
army depends upon the civilian population of its home country
for supplies, recruits, and political support. But this dependence
is usually indirect, mediated by the bureaucratic apparatus of
the state or the exchange system of the economy....But in guerrilla
war, the dependence is immediate: the farmer hands the food to
the guerrilla.Similarly, an ordinary citizen may vote for a political
party that in turn supports the war effort and whose leaders are
called in for military briefings. But in guerrilla war, the support
a civilian provides is far more direct. He doesn't need to be
briefed; he already knows the most important secret: he knows
who the guerrillas are.The people, or some of them, are complicitous
in guerrilla war, and the war would be impossible without their
complicity.[G]uerrilla war makes for enforced intimacies, and
the people are drawn into it in a new way even though the services
they provide are nothing more than functional equivalents of the
services civilians have always provided for soldiers.
If the questions Dershowitz poses are
not original, it must be said that his answers are, at any rate
coming from someone who claims to be a liberal. He writes, for
instance, that "the Israeli army has given well-publicized
notice to civilians to leave those areas of southern Lebanon that
have been turned into war zones. Those who voluntarily remain
behind have become complicit." In fact, Walzer ponders precisely
this scenario in the context of the Vietnam war where, according
to the rules of engagement, "civilians were to be given warning
in advance of the destruction of their villages, so that they
could break with the guerrillas, expel them, or leave themselves.Any
village known to be hostile could be bombed or shelled if its
inhabitants were warned in advance, either by the dropping of
leaflets or by helicopter loudspeaker." In Walzer's judgment
such rules "could hardly be defended" in view of the
massive devastation wrought. In the event that "civilians,
duly warned, not only refuse to expel the guerrillas but also
refuse to leave themselves," Walzer goes on to stress,
so long as they give only political support,
they are not legitimate targets, either as a group or as distinguishable
individuals.So far as combat goes, these people cannot be shot
on sight, when no firefight is in progress; nor can their villages
be attacked merely because they might be used as firebases or
because it is expected that they will be used; nor can they be
randomly bombed and shelled, even after warning has been given.
To be sure, Walzer wrote this in the context
of Vietnam. Like Dershowitz, he became a born-again Zionist after
the June 1967 war and accordingly has applied an altogether different
standard to Israel. Whereas Dershowitz plays the tough Jew, Walzer's
assigned role has been to stamp as kosher every war Israel wages,
but only after anxious sighs. Thus, while HRW was deploring Israel's
war crimes, Walzer opined on cue that "from a moral perspective,
Israel has mostly been fighting legitimately," and that if
Israeli commanders ever faced an international tribunal, "the
defense lawyers will have a good case," mainly because Hezbollah
has used civilians as human shields _ even if in the real world
they haven't.
Dershowitz purports to make the case that
the laws of war need to be revised in the "new" age
of terrorism. In fact, his real concern is an old one. A standard
tactic of Israel in its armed hostilities with Arab neighbors
has been to inflict massive, indiscriminate civilian casualties,
and Dershowitz's standard defense has been to deny it. But the
credibility of human rights organizations that have documented
these war crimes is rather higher than that of this notorious
serial prevaricator, which is why he so loathes them. Dershowitz
now uses the war on terror as a pretext to strip civilians of
any protections in time of war, dragging the law down to put it
on level with Israel's criminal practices.
The main target of his "reassessment
of the laws of war" has been the fundamental distinction
between civilians and combatants. Ridiculing what he deems the
"increasingly meaningless word 'civilian'" and asserting
that, in the case of terrorist organizations like Hezbollah, "'civilianality'
is often a matter of degree, rather than a bright line,"
Dershowitz proposes to replace the civilian-combatant dichotomy
with a "continuum of civilianality":
Near the most civilian end of this continuum
are the pure innocents _ babies, hostages and others completely
uninvolved; at the more combatant end are civilians who willingly
harbor terrorists, provide material resources and serve as human
shields; in the middle are those who support the terrorists politically,
or spiritually.
He imagines that this revision wouldn't
apply to Israel because "the line between Israeli soldiers
and civilians is relatively clear." But is this true? Israel
has a civilian army, which means a mere call-up slip or phone
call separates each adult Israeli male from a combatant. Israeli
civilians willingly provide material resources to the army. To
judge by its targeting of Lebanese power grids, factories, roads,
bridges, trucks, vans, ambulances, airports, and seaports, Israel
must reckon all civilian infrastructure legitimate military targets,
in which case all Israelis residing in the vicinity of such Israeli
infrastructure constitute human shields. Israel's recent brutal
assault on Lebanon, like its past wars during which massive war
crimes were committed, has enjoyed overwhelming political and
spiritual support from the population. "If the media were
to adopt the 'continuum' he has proposed, Dershowitz reflects,
"it would be informative to learn how many of the 'civilian
casualties' fall closer to the line of complicity and how many
fall closer to the line of innocence." It would seem, however,
that on his spectrum nearly every Israeli would be complicitous.
In light of the revisions Dershowitz enters
in international law, his reasoning begins to verge on the bizarre.
He asserts that inasmuch as the Lebanese population overwhelmingly
"supports Hezbollah," there are no real civilians or
civilian casualties in Lebanon: "It is virtually impossible
to distinguish the Hezbollah dead from the truly civilian dead,
just as it is virtually impossible to distinguish the Hezbollah
living from the civilian living." If this be the case, however,
it is hard to make out the meaning of Dershowitz's praise of Israel
for only targeting Hezbollah terrorists in Lebanon. Didn't he
just say that all of the Lebanese are Hezbollah? Similarly he
condemns Hezbollah for targeting Israeli civilians. But Israelis
are no less supportive of the IDF than Lebanese are of Hezbollah.
Doesn't this mean that Hezbollah can't be targeting civilians
in Israel because there aren't any? These are of course quibbles
next to the fact that Dershowitz has now sanctioned mass murder
of the Lebanese people.
It remains to consider Dershowitz's own
location on the continuum of civilianality. Israel could not have
waged any of its wars of aggression or committed any of its war
crimes without the blanket political and military support of the
United States. Using his academic pedigree Dershowitz has played
a conspicuous, crucial and entirely voluntary public role in rallying
such support. He has for decades grossly falsified Israel's human
rights record. He has urged the use of collective punishment such
as the "automatic destruction" of a Palestinian village
after each Palestinian attack. He has covered up Israel's use
of torture on Palestinian detainees, and himself advocated the
application of "excruciating" torture on suspected terrorists
such as a "needle being shoved under the fingernails."
He has aligned himself with the Israeli government against courageous
Israeli pilots refusing the immorality of targeted assassinations.
He has denounced nonviolent resisters to the Israeli occupation
as "supporters of Palestinian terrorism." He has dismissed
ethnic cleansing as a "fifth-rate issue" akin to "massive
urban renewal." He has advised Israel's senior government
officials that Israel is not bound by international law. He has
now sanctioned the extermination of the Lebanese people.
Finally, in Preemption he boasts of having
vicariously participated in a targeted assassination while visiting
Israel:
I watched as a high-intensity television
camera, mounted on a drone, zeroed in on the apartment of a terrorist
... I watched as the camera focused on the house and the nearly
empty streets.
It seems, however, that this moral pervert
missed the climactic scene of his little peep show, although it
isn't reported whether he got his quarter back: "I was permitted
to watch for only a few minutes, and no action was taken while
I was watching because the target remained in the house."
One wonders whether Dershowitz carefully inserted these weasel
words because, as he well knows, targeted assassinations constitute
war crimes, and he might otherwise be charged as an accessory
to one.
In Preemption Dershowitz observes that
"there can be no question that some kinds of expression contribute
significantly to some kinds of evil." In this context he
recalls that the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda handed
down life sentences to Hutu radio broadcasters for inciting listeners
to "hatred and murders." He also recalls the highly
pertinent case of Nazi propagandist Julius Streicher, who was
described by writer Rebecca West as "a dirty old man of the
sort that gives trouble in parks," and by Nuremberg prosecutor
Telford Taylor as "neither attractive nor bright." Although
Hitler had stripped this self-styled Zionist and expert on Jews
of all his political power by 1940, and his pornographic newspaper
Der Stuermer had a circulation of only some 15,000 during the
war, the International Tribunal at Nuremberg nonetheless sentenced
Streicher to death for his murderous incitement.
On his continuum of civilianality Dershowitz
appears to fall in the proximity of the Hutu radio broadcasters
and Streicher _ less direct in his appeal, more influential in
his reach. It is highly unlikely, however, that he will ever be
brought before a tribunal for his criminal incitement. But there
is yet another possibility for achieving justice. Dershowitz is
a strong advocate of targeted assassinations when "reasonable
alternatives" such as arrest and capture aren't available.
The conclusion seems clear -- if , and only if, -- one uses his
standard and his reasoning. Of course, the preponderance of humanity,
this writer [and CounterPunch, Eds.,] included, does not think
this way. After all the hard-won gains of civilization, who would
want to live in a world that once again legally sanctioned torture,
collective punishment, assassinations and mass murder? As Dershowitz
descends into barbarism, it remains a hopeful sign that few seem
inclined to join him.
Norman Finkelstein's most recent book
is Beyond Chutzpah: On the misuse of anti-Semitism and the abuse
of history (University of California Press). His web site is www.NormanFinkelstein.com.
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