Opportunism in the War on Terrorism
Governments are using the war on terrorism
to quelch opposition
by Simon Helweg-Larsen
Z magazine, April 2002
Whatever the motives, the fight against terrorism since September
11 has truly been global. In Nepal, Chechnya, Egypt, India, Israel,
and so many other nations, the rhetoric mimicking U.S. anti-terrorist
pledges has sprung up not only in response to George W. Bush's
"with us or against us" attitude, but also as a shift
in official language on existing internal conflicts. Where many
countries recently hid repressive or counterinsurgent activities
from the international spotlight, the acquisition of the anti-terrorist
lingo has seemingly lent authenticity and even moral authority
to politics based on righteous bullying in the name of security.
Latin American countries have not been the exception to this
trend in any sense. Interesting in the Latin American response
to September 11 is the double opportunism that many governments
have been practicing, both wooing the United States with anti-terrorism
compliance and taking advantage of the situation to quelch national
opposition and strengthen personal power. This comes in addition
to a further increase in arms delivery to a region that has been
seeing, long before September 11, a remilitarization unprecedented
in the hemisphere since the end of the Cold War.
The attacks on the United States that instantaneously altered
world politics came at an apt time for Latin America. Economic
and political crises were looming in many countries and had erupted
into disaster in others. Months before the overthrow of President
De la Rua, Argentines had been taking to the streets on a regular
basis due to the trickling availability of food and finances.
In Bolivia, popular demonstrations against privatization and other
economic measures were marred by state violence. Mexico was experiencing
an economic slowdown that helped bring President Vincente Fox's
popularity ratings down from the high 80s to the mid 40s. Coffee
prices had hit rock bottom, and the large populations of poor
and often migrant laborers dependent on coffee for survival were
left stranded and begging for food. The violence in Colombia continued,
intensifying within the country and spreading beyond its borders
to Peru and Ecuador as the United States continued delivering
installments in its $1.3 billion Plan Colombia military package.
A Mexican professor and former U.S. State Department official
said of the situation, "Any one of these countries are powder
kegs that can explode at any moment. "
Indeed, the prevailing attitude within Latin American diplomatic
circles prior to September 11 was one of worry over looming crises
and frustration at U.S. failure to pay attention to those countries
in need. Argentina seemed to be the clearest case: the country
was in economic ruins with serious political instability, but
the dominant attitude from financial institutions to the north
was one of weathering out the storm. It should come as no surprise,
then, that the immediate response from officials across Latin
America to the September 11 attacks was visible support for U.S.
anti-terrorist measures as countries jumped on the opportunity
to win favor and attention from the North. Approximately 6 million
people of Arab descent live in Latin America, and they immediately
began to feel the heat from Latin American countries as well as
the U.S. The "Triple Frontier" border area of Argentina,
Brazil, and Paraguay, home to one of the largest Arab concentrations
in Latin America, has "come to resemble Casablanca during
World War II, with local intelligence and law-enforcement agencies
being joined by a number of U.S. counterparts, as well as Israel's
Mossad and the German and Spanish secret services."
Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay have also lent forces to the
round-up, and dozens of Lebanese, Jordanian and Syrian citizens
were quickly arrested on immigration charges during door-to-door
searches and highway checkpoints. Latin American officials adopted
anti-terrorist language and allowed a U. S. presence to harass
its Arab communities in hopes of winning favorable attention in
their economic and political hardships. This has not been the
sole response of Latin American countries, however, as many have
taken advantage of the anti-terrorist hysteria in the North to
reverse measures that have prevented them from dealing harshly
with domestic opposition. The majority of countries in Latin America
have a long history of military involvement in politics and of
violent repression of the poor majority.
Many of the countries were also blatantly dominated by military
forces less than 15 years ago, and while international pressure
upholds a facade of commitment to civilian democracy, military
strongmen from the recent past often retain powerful positions
and continue to wield significant influence. Countries throughout
the hemisphere have thus been quick to establish military-led
"anti-terrorism" commissions to guard the nation against
terrorist threats. The United States certainly approves of this
move, fearing that al-Qaeda and other organizations may decide
to use Latin American countries "as a route to place [their]
assets in the United States." Military elements in countries
with newly established commissions are overjoyed with the opportunity
to again step up intelligence, and possibly counterinsurgent,
activities within their borders. Guatemala provides a prime example
of the situation surrounding Latin American anti-terrorism commissions.
The Central American nation experienced Latin America's most brutal
armed conflict over a 36-year period, which left around 200,000
people dead or "disappeared" and over 1 million displaced
out of a total population of around 8 million. Since the return
to civilian electoral democracy in 1985 and the signing of final
peace accords in 1996, human rights abuses have continued, and
even increased in some areas.
The military, while remaining prominent in national politics,
has been limited in its role of internal security due to measures
outlined in the peace agreements. In recent years, however, the
military has managed to increase its national role and presence,
and the establishment of an anti-terrorism commission is another
large step towards remilitarization. The commission, set up "to
protect the national territory in the eventuality of a terrorist
attack," is headed by former general Miguel Angel Calderon,
a prominent general who specialized in "the tactics of counterinsurgency"
during the worst era of Guatemalan genocide. In addition to being
frightening for the country's future human rights record, the
appointment of Calder6n to head the commission directly violates
Guatemala's peace accords, which explicitly call for civilian
control of public security. Caldron's pro-military ideology and
belief in strong-handed tactics are well known, and there is little
doubt that he will carry his lifelong interest of forceful eradication
of opposition to his new post. So we see the double opportunism
that Latin American leaders have practiced in recent months, using
anti-terrorist hysteria to attract U.S. attention to the ailing
region as well as jumping on a chance to strengthen military power
that has been restrained by international pressure in recent years.
But it has not just been the Latin American countries that have
been using the situation to their benefit.
The United States has also taken advantage of the times to
further increase military aid to the region, a policy that has
been incrementally and successfully followed since former president
Bill Clinton's second term in office. The scope of this article
does not allow for a full explanation of U.S. motives for militarization
in Latin America, but suffice it to say that a history of aggressive
domination of resources as well as a political and economic system
that rests heavily on a powerful military-industrial complex has
led to a resurgence of promotion of military activity under the
guise of a war on drugs. Terrorism, as we shall see, has allowed
for the continued arming of various countries and a shift in policy
towards secrecy in favor of "security." Colombia and
its neighbors demonstrate an excellent example of this increased
military aid. Colombia-rich in oil, bordering the Amazon fresh
water supply, key in-route to South America, and under constant
threat from (formerly) Marxist guerrillas-has been the focus of
U.S. attention in Latin America since the 1999 announcement of
Plan Colombia. The Plan produced $1.3 billion in military aid
for Colombia and an increased surveillance and training role for
U.S. officials on the ground. Since military activities have been
stepped up in Colombia, the conflict has begun to spread beyond
Colombia's borders, and Plan Colombia is now known as the Andean
Initiative.
Some analysts believe that the focus on the war on terrorism
will allow less attention to be lent to this initiative. Still,
this year's aid package to countries surrounding Colombia will
provide a 220 percent increase over 2000-2001 averages in military
aid to Panama, a 144 percent increase for Venezuela, 345 percent
for Brazil, and between 20 percent and 82 percent increases for
Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru. Security and intelligence-gathering
will continue to increase this coming year, whether in the name
of the war on drugs, the war on terrorism, or just old-fashioned
military spending. In addition to military spending, the war on
terrorism has allowed the United States to increase secrecy surrounding
its role in Latin American security and to reverse human rights
conditions on military aid. U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld
has made clear the Bush administration's new level of intolerance
for information leaks, which for Latin America would probably
translate to a refusal to release details surrounding CIA and
military activities in the mounting conflicts of the Andean region.
After decades of U.S. support for human rights violators in defense
of larger policy goals, guidelines established in 1996 prohibited
the funding of individuals or organizations believed to be involved
in human rights violations. This "cuts back on your ability
to recruit spies inside terrorist organizations if you can't recruit
people with some kind of violent past," complains former
CIA director James Woolsey. A probable scenario is that these
recent guidelines will be struck for what the Administration sees
as extraordinary circumstances requiring all possible avenues
to be left open for intelligence-gathering. While this may (or
may not) be a valid argument for intelligence within al-Qaeda,
the blanket lifting of such restrictions will only mean further
funding of repressive government and paramilitary forces in Colombia
and other Latin American countries.
While military elements in many societies jump at the chance
to increase their activities in the name of the prevention of
terrorism, leaders and officials are embracing any anti-terrorism
moves deemed necessary by the United States in hopes of winning
attention for national economic crises. These crises remain and
worsen, however, as the only significant assistance that Latin
America has seen in the past few months has been in the form of
arms deliveries and pledges to further increase and cloak U.S.
military activities in the region. We are quickly heading into
yet another dark period in Latin American history with the full
blessing of the United States government and the overjoyed endorsement
of the region's powerful factions.
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