Washington's interests in Israel's
by Seymour Hersch
The New Yorker
www.zmag.org, August 16, 2006
In the days after Hezbollah crossed from
Lebanon into Israel, on July 12th, to kidnap two soldiers, triggering
an Israeli air attack on Lebanon and a full-scale war, the Bush
Administration seemed strangely passive. "It's a moment of
clarification," President George W. Bush said at the G-8
summit, in St. Petersburg, on July 16th. "It's now become
clear why we don't have peace in the Middle East." He described
the relationship between Hezbollah and its supporters in Iran
and Syria as one of the "root causes of instability,"
and subsequently said that it was up to those countries to end
the crisis. Two days later, despite calls from several governments
for the United States to take the lead in negotiations to end
the fighting, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said that a
ceasefire should be put off until "the conditions are conducive."
The Bush Administration, however, was
closely involved in the planning of Israel's retaliatory attacks.
President Bush and Vice-President Dick Cheney were convinced,
current and former intelligence and diplomatic officials told
me, that a successful Israeli Air Force bombing campaign against
Hezbollah's heavily fortified underground-missile and command-and-control
complexes in Lebanon could ease Israel's security concerns and
also serve as a prelude to a potential American preëmptive
attack to destroy Iran's nuclear installations, some of which
are also buried deep underground.
Israeli military and intelligence experts I spoke to emphasized
that the country's immediate security issues were reason enough
to confront Hezbollah, regardless of what the Bush Administration
wanted. Shabtai Shavit, a national-security adviser to the Knesset
who headed the Mossad, Israel's foreign-intelligence service,
from 1989 to 1996, told me, "We do what we think is best
for us, and if it happens to meet America's requirements, that's
just part of a relationship between two friends.
Hezbollah is armed to the teeth and trained in the most advanced
technology of guerrilla warfare. It was just a matter of time.
We had to address it."
Hezbollah is seen by Israelis as a profound threat-a terrorist
organization, operating on their border, with a military arsenal
that, with help from Iran and Syria, has grown stronger since
the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon ended, in 2000. Hezbollah's
leader, Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, has said he does not believe
that Israel is a "legal state." Israeli intelligence
estimated at the outset of the air war that Hezbollah had roughly
five hundred medium-range Fajr-3 and Fajr-5 rockets and a few
dozen long-range Zelzal rockets; the Zelzals, with a range of
about two hundred kilometres, could reach Tel Aviv. (One rocket
hit Haifa the day after the
kidnappings.) It also has more than twelve thousand shorter-range
Since the conflict began, more than three thousand of these have
been fired at Israel.
According to a Middle East expert with knowledge of the current
thinking of both the Israeli and the U.S. governments, Israel
had devised a plan for attacking Hezbollah-and shared it with
Bush Administration officials-well before the July 12th kidnappings.
"It's not that the Israelis had a trap that Hezbollah walked
into," he said, "but there was a strong feeling in the
White House that sooner or later the Israelis were going to do
The Middle East expert said that the Administration had several
reasons for supporting the Israeli bombing campaign. Within the
State Department, it was seen as a way to strengthen the Lebanese
government so that it could assert its authority over the south
of the country, much of which is controlled by Hezbollah. He went
on, "The White House was more focussed on stripping Hezbollah
of its missiles, because, if there was to be a military option
against Iran's nuclear facilities, it had to get rid of the weapons
that Hezbollah could use in a potential retaliation at Israel.
Bush wanted both.
Bush was going after Iran, as part of the Axis of Evil, and its
nuclear sites, and he was interested in going after Hezbollah
as part of his interest in democratization, with Lebanon as one
of the crown jewels of Middle East democracy."
Administration officials denied that they knew of Israel's plan
for the air war. The White House did not respond to a detailed
list of questions. In response to a separate request, a National
Security Council spokesman said, "Prior to Hezbollah's attack
on Israel, the Israeli government gave no official in Washington
any reason to believe that Israel was planning to attack. Even
after the July 12th attack, we did not know what the Israeli plans
were." A Pentagon spokesman said, "The United States
government remains committed to a diplomatic solution to the problem
of Iran's clandestine nuclear weapons program," and denied
the story, as did a State Department spokesman.
The United States and Israel have shared intelligence and enjoyed
close military coöperation for decades, but early this spring,
according to a former senior intelligence official, high-level
planners from the U.S. Air Force-under pressure from the White
House to develop a war plan for a decisive strike against Iran's
nuclear facilities-began consulting with their counterparts in
the Israeli Air Force.
"The big question for our Air Force was how to hit a series
of hard targets in Iran successfully," the former senior
intelligence official said. "Who is the closest ally of the
U.S. Air Force in its planning? It's not Congo-it's Israel. Everybody
knows that Iranian engineers have been advising Hezbollah on tunnels
and underground gun emplacements. And so the Air Force went to
the Israelis with some new tactics and said to them, 'Let's concentrate
on the bombing and share what we have on Iran and what you have
on Lebanon.' "
The discussions reached the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, he said.
"The Israelis told us it would be a cheap war with many benefits,"
government consultant with close ties to Israel said. "Why
oppose it? We'll be able to hunt down and bomb missiles, tunnels,
and bunkers from the air.
It would be a demo for Iran."
A Pentagon consultant said that the Bush White House "has
been agitating for some time to find a reason for a preëmptive
blow against Hezbollah." He added, "It was our intent
to have Hezbollah diminished, and now we have someone else doing
it." (As this article went to press, the United Nations Security
Council passed a ceasefire resolution, although it was unclear
if it would change the situation on the ground.)
According to Richard Armitage, who served as Deputy Secretary
of State in Bush's first term-and who, in 2002, said that Hezbollah
"may be the A team of terrorists"-Israel's campaign
in Lebanon, which has faced unexpected difficulties and widespread
criticism, may, in the end, serve as a warning to the White House
about Iran. "If the most dominant military force in the region-the
Israel Defense Forces-can't pacify a country like Lebanon, with
a population of four million, you should think carefully about
taking that template to Iran, with strategic depth and a population
of seventy million,"
Armitage said. "The only thing that the bombing has achieved
so far is to unite the population against the Israelis."
Several current and former officials involved in the Middle East
told me that Israel viewed the soldiers' kidnapping as the opportune
moment to begin its planned military campaign against Hezbollah.
"Hezbollah, like clockwork, was instigating something small
every month or two," the U.S. government consultant with
ties to Israel said. Two weeks earlier, in late June, members
of Hamas, the Palestinian group, had tunnelled under the barrier
separating southern Gaza from Israel and captured an Israeli soldier.
Hamas also had lobbed a series of rockets at Israeli towns near
the border with Gaza. In response, Israel had initiated an extensive
bombing campaign and reoccupied parts of Gaza.
The Pentagon consultant noted that there had also been cross-border
incidents involving Israel and Hezbollah, in both directions,
for some time.
"They've been sniping at each other," he said. "Either
side could have pointed to some incident and said 'We have to
go to war with these guys'-because they were already at war."
David Siegel, the spokesman at the Israeli Embassy in Washington,
said that the Israeli Air Force had not been seeking a reason
to attack Hezbollah. "We did not plan the campaign. That
decision was forced on us." There were ongoing alerts that
Hezbollah "was pressing to go on the attack," Siegel
said. "Hezbollah attacks every two or three months,"
but the kidnapping of the soldiers raised the stakes.
In interviews, several Israeli academics, journalists, and retired
military and intelligence officers all made one point: they believed
that the Israeli leadership, and not Washington, had decided that
it would go to war with Hezbollah. Opinion polls showed that a
broad spectrum of Israelis supported that choice. "The neocons
in Washington may be happy, but Israel did not need to be pushed,
because Israel has been wanting to get rid of Hezbollah,"
Yossi Melman, a journalist for the newspaper Ha'aretz, who has
written several books about the Israeli intelligence community,
said. "By provoking Israel, Hezbollah provided that opportunity."
"We were facing a dilemma," an Israeli official said.
Prime Minister Ehud Olmert "had to decide whether to go for
a local response, which we always do, or for a comprehensive response-to
really take on Hezbollah once and for all." Olmert made his
decision, the official said, only after a series of Israeli rescue
The U.S. government consultant with close ties to Israel told
me, however, that, from Israel's perspective, the decision to
take strong action had become inevitable weeks earlier, after
the Israeli Army's signals intelligence group, known as Unit 8200,
picked up bellicose intercepts in late spring and early summer,
involving Hamas, Hezbollah, and Khaled Meshal, the Hamas leader
now living in Damascus.
One intercept was of a meeting in late May of the Hamas political
and military leadership, with Meshal participating by telephone.
"Hamas believed the call from Damascus was scrambled, but
Israel had broken the code," the consultant said. For almost
a year before its victory in the Palestinian elections in January,
Hamas had curtailed its terrorist activities. In the late May
intercepted conversation, the consultant told me, the Hamas leadership
said that "they got no benefit from it, and were losing standing
among the Palestinian population." The conclusion, he said,
was " 'Let's go back into the terror business and then try
and wrestle concessions from the Israeli government.' " The
consultant told me that the U.S. and Israel agreed that if the
Hamas leadership did so, and if Nasrallah backed them up, there
should be "a full-scale response." In the next several
weeks, when Hamas began digging the tunnel into Israel, the consultant
said, Unit 8200 "picked up signals intelligence involving
Hamas, Syria, and Hezbollah, saying, in essence, that they wanted
Hezbollah to 'warm up' the north." In one intercept, the
consultant said, Nasrallah referred to Olmert and Defense Minister
Amir Peretz "as seeming to be weak," in comparison with
the former Prime Ministers Ariel Sharon and Ehud Barak, who had
extensive military experience, and said "he thought Israel
would respond in a small-scale, local way, as they had in the
Earlier this summer, before the Hezbollah kidnappings, the U.S.
government consultant said, several Israeli officials visited
Washington, separately, "to get a green light for the bombing
operation and to find out how much the United States would bear."
The consultant added, "Israel began with Cheney.
It wanted to be sure that it had his support and the support of
his office and the Middle East desk of the National Security Council."
After that, "persuading Bush was never a problem, and Condi
Rice was on board," the consultant said.
The initial plan, as outlined by the Israelis, called for a major
bombing campaign in response to the next Hezbollah provocation,
according to the Middle East expert with knowledge of U.S. and
Israeli thinking. Israel believed that, by targeting Lebanon's
infrastructure, including highways, fuel depots, and even the
civilian runways at the main Beirut airport, it could persuade
Lebanon's large Christian and Sunni populations to turn against
Hezbollah, according to the former senior intelligence official.
The airport, highways, and bridges, among other things, have been
hit in the bombing campaign. The Israeli Air Force had flown almost
nine thousand missions as of last week. (David Siegel, the Israeli
spokesman, said that Israel had targeted only sites connected
to Hezbollah; the bombing of bridges and roads was meant to prevent
the transport of weapons.)
The Israeli plan, according to the former senior intelligence
official, was "the mirror image of what the United States
has been planning for Iran."
(The initial U.S. Air Force proposals for an air attack to destroy
Iran's nuclear capacity, which included the option of intense
bombing of civilian infrastructure targets inside Iran, have been
resisted by the top leadership of the Army, the Navy, and the
Marine Corps, according to current and former officials. They
argue that the Air Force plan will not work and will inevitably
lead, as in the Israeli war with Hezbollah, to the insertion of
troops on the ground.)
Uzi Arad, who served for more than two decades in the Mossad,
told me that to the best of his knowledge the contacts between
the Israeli and U.S.
governments were routine, and that, "in all my meetings and
conversations with government officials, never once did I hear
anyone refer to prior coördination with the United States."
He was troubled by one issue-the speed with which the Olmert government
went to war. "For the life of me, I've never seen a decision
to go to war taken so speedily," he said. "We usually
go through long analyses."
The key military planner was Lieutenant General Dan Halutz, the
I.D.F. chief of staff, who, during a career in the Israeli Air
Force, worked on contingency planning for an air war with Iran.
Olmert, a former mayor of Jerusalem, and Peretz, a former labor
leader, could not match his experience and expertise.
In the early discussions with American officials, I was told by
the Middle East expert and the government consultant, the Israelis
repeatedly pointed to the war in Kosovo as an example of what
Israel would try to achieve. The NATO forces commanded by U.S.
Army General Wesley Clark methodically bombed and strafed not
only military targets but tunnels, bridges, and roads, in Kosovo
and elsewhere in Serbia, for seventy-eight days before forcing
Serbian forces to withdraw from Kosovo. "Israel studied the
Kosovo war as its role model," the government consultant
said. "The Israelis told Condi Rice, 'You did it in about
seventy days, but we need half of that-thirty-five days.' "
There are, of course, vast differences between Lebanon and Kosovo.
Clark, who retired from the military in 2000 and unsuccessfully
ran as a Democrat for the Presidency in 2004, took issue with
the analogy: "If it's true that the Israeli campaign is based
on the American approach in Kosovo, then it missed the point.
Ours was to use force to obtain a diplomatic objective-it was
not about killing people." Clark noted in a 2001 book, "Waging
Modern War," that it was the threat of a possible ground
invasion as well as the bombing that forced the Serbs to end the
war. He told me, "In my experience, air campaigns have to
be backed, ultimately, by the will and capability to finish the
job on the ground."
Kosovo has been cited publicly by Israeli officials and journalists
since the war began. On August 6th, Prime Minister Olmert, responding
to European condemnation of the deaths of Lebanese civilians,
said, "Where do they get the right to preach to Israel? European
countries attacked Kosovo and killed ten thousand civilians. Ten
thousand! And none of these countries had to suffer before that
from a single rocket. I'm not saying it was wrong to intervene
in Kosovo. But please: don't preach to us about the treatment
of civilians." (Human Rights Watch estimated the number of
civilians killed in the NATO bombing to be five hundred; the Yugoslav
government put the number between twelve hundred and five thousand.)
Cheney's office supported the Israeli plan, as did Elliott Abrams,
a deputy national-security adviser, according to several former
and current officials. (A spokesman for the N.S.C. denied that
Abrams had done so.) They believed that Israel should move quickly
in its air war against Hezbollah. A former intelligence officer
said, "We told Israel, 'Look, if you guys have to go, we're
behind you all the way. But we think it should be sooner rather
than later-the longer you wait, the less time we have to evaluate
and plan for Iran before Bush gets out of office.' "
Cheney's point, the former senior intelligence official said,
was "What if the Israelis execute their part of this first,
and it's really successful?
It'd be great. We can learn what to do in Iran by watching what
the Israelis do in Lebanon."
The Pentagon consultant told me that intelligence about Hezbollah
and Iran is being mishandled by the White House the same way intelligence
had been when, in 2002 and early 2003, the Administration was
making the case that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. "The
big complaint now in the intelligence community is that all of
the important stuff is being sent directly to the top-at the insistence
of the White House-and not being analyzed at all, or scarcely,"
he said. "It's an awful policy and violates all of the N.S.A.'s
strictures, and if you complain about it you're out," he
said. "Cheney had a strong hand in this."
The long-term Administration goal was to help set up a Sunni Arab
coalition-including countries like Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt-that
would join the United States and Europe to pressure the ruling
Shiite mullahs in Iran. "But the thought behind that plan
was that Israel would defeat Hezbollah, not lose to it,"
the consultant with close ties to Israel said. Some officials
in Cheney's office and at the N.S.C. had become convinced, on
the basis of private talks, that those nations would moderate
their public criticism of Israel and blame Hezbollah for creating
the crisis that led to war. Although they did so at first, they
shifted their position in the wake of public protests in their
countries about the Israeli bombing.
The White House was clearly disappointed when, late last month,
Prince Saud al-Faisal, the Saudi foreign minister, came to Washington
and, at a meeting with Bush, called for the President to intervene
immediately to end the war.
The Washington Post reported that Washington had hoped to enlist
moderate Arab states "in an effort to pressure Syria and
Iran to rein in Hezbollah, but the Saudi move . . . seemed to
cloud that initiative."
The surprising strength of Hezbollah's resistance, and its continuing
ability to fire rockets into northern Israel in the face of the
constant Israeli bombing, the Middle East expert told me, "is
a massive setback for those in the White House who want to use
force in Iran. And those who argue that the bombing will create
internal dissent and revolt in Iran are also set back."
Nonetheless, some officers serving with the Joint Chiefs of Staff
remain deeply concerned that the Administration will have a far
more positive assessment of the air campaign than they should,
the former senior intelligence official said. "There is no
way that Rumsfeld and Cheney will draw the right conclusion about
this," he said. "When the smoke clears, they'll say
it was a success, and they'll draw reinforcement for their plan
to attack Iran."
In the White House, especially in the Vice-President's office,
many officials believe that the military campaign against Hezbollah
is working and should be carried forward. At the same time, the
government consultant said, some policymakers in the Administration
have concluded that the cost of the bombing to Lebanese society
is too high. "They are telling Israel that it's time to wind
down the attacks on infrastructure."
Similar divisions are emerging in Israel. David Siegel, the Israeli
spokesman, said that his country's leadership believed, as of
early August, that the air war had been successful, and had destroyed
more than seventy per cent of Hezbollah's medium- and long-range-missile
"The problem is short-range missiles, without launchers,
that can be shot from civilian areas and homes," Siegel told
me. "The only way to resolve this is ground operations-which
is why Israel would be forced to expand ground operations if the
latest round of diplomacy doesn't work." Last week, however,
there was evidence that the Israeli government was troubled by
the progress of the war. In an unusual move, Major General Moshe
Kaplinsky, Halutz's deputy, was put in charge of the operation,
supplanting Major General Udi Adam. The worry in Israel is that
Nasrallah might escalate the crisis by firing missiles at Tel
Aviv. "There is a big debate over how much damage Israel
should inflict to prevent it," the consultant said. "If
Nasrallah hits Tel Aviv, what should Israel do? Its goal is to
deter more attacks by telling Nasrallah that it will destroy his
country if he doesn't stop, and to remind the Arab world that
Israel can set it back twenty years.
We're no longer playing by the same rules."
A European intelligence officer told me, "The Israelis have
been caught in a psychological trap. In earlier years, they had
the belief that they could solve their problems with toughness.
But now, with Islamic martyrdom, things have changed, and they
need different answers. How do you scare people who love martyrdom?"
The problem with trying to eliminate Hezbollah, the intelligence
officer said, is the group's ties to the Shiite population in
southern Lebanon, the Bekaa Valley, and Beirut's southern suburbs,
where it operates schools, hospitals, a radio station, and various
A high-level American military planner told me, "We have
a lot of vulnerability in the region, and we've talked about some
of the effects of an Iranian or Hezbollah attack on the Saudi
regime and on the oil infrastructure." There is special concern
inside the Pentagon, he added, about the oil-producing nations
north of the Strait of Hormuz. "We have to anticipate the
unintended consequences," he told me. "Will we be able
to absorb a barrel of oil at one hundred dollars? There is this
almost comical thinking that you can do it all from the air, even
when you're up against an irregular enemy with a dug-in capability.
You're not going to be successful unless you have a ground presence,
but the political leadership never considers the worst case. These
guys only want to hear the best case."
There is evidence that the Iranians were expecting the war against
Hezbollah. Vali Nasr, an expert on Shiite Muslims and Iran, who
is a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and also teaches
at the Naval Postgraduate School, in Monterey, California, said,
"Every negative American move against Hezbollah was seen
by Iran as part of a larger campaign against it. And Iran began
to prepare for the showdown by supplying more sophisticated weapons
to Hezbollah-anti-ship and anti-tank missiles-and training its
fighters in their use. And now Hezbollah is testing Iran's new
weapons. Iran sees the Bush Administration as trying to marginalize
its regional role, so it fomented trouble."
Nasr, an Iranian-American who recently published a study of the
Sunni-Shiite divide, entitled "The Shia Revival," also
said that the Iranian leadership believes that Washington's ultimate
political goal is to get some international force to act as a
buffer-to physically separate Syria and Lebanon in an effort to
isolate and disarm Hezbollah, whose main supply route is through
Syria. "Military action cannot bring about the desired political
result," Nasr said. The popularity of Iran's President, Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad, a virulent critic of Israel, is greatest in his own
country. If the U.S. were to attack Iran's nuclear facilities,
Nasr said, "you may end up turning Ahmadinejad into another
Nasrallah-the rock star of the Arab street."
Donald Rumsfeld, who is one of the Bush Administration's most
outspoken, and powerful, officials, has said very little publicly
about the crisis in Lebanon. His relative quiet, compared to his
aggressive visibility in the run-up to the Iraq war, has prompted
a debate in Washington about where he stands on the issue.
Some current and former intelligence officials who were interviewed
for this article believe that Rumsfeld disagrees with Bush and
Cheney about the American role in the war between Israel and Hezbollah.
The U.S. government consultant with close ties to Israel said
that "there was a feeling that Rumsfeld was jaded in his
approach to the Israeli war." He added, "Air power and
the use of a few Special Forces had worked in Afghanistan, and
he tried to do it again in Iraq. It was the same idea, but it
didn't work. He thought that Hezbollah was too dug in and the
Israeli attack plan would not work, and the last thing he wanted
was another war on his shift that would put the American forces
in Iraq in greater jeopardy."
A Western diplomat said that he understood that Rumsfeld did not
know all the intricacies of the war plan. "He is angry and
worried about his troops"
in Iraq, the diplomat said. Rumsfeld served in the White House
during the last year of the war in Vietnam, from which American
troops withdrew in 1975, "and he did not want to see something
like this having an impact in Iraq." Rumsfeld's concern,
the diplomat added, was that an expansion of the war into Iran
could put the American troops in Iraq at greater risk of attacks
by pro-Iranian Shiite militias.
At a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on August 3rd, Rumsfeld
was less than enthusiastic about the war's implications for the
American troops in Iraq. Asked whether the Administration was
mindful of the war's impact on Iraq, he testified that, in his
meetings with Bush and Condoleezza Rice, "there is a sensitivity
to the desire to not have our country or our interests or our
forces put at greater risk as a result of what's taking place
between Israel and Hezbollah. . . . There are a variety of risks
that we face in that region, and it's a difficult and delicate
The Pentagon consultant dismissed talk of a split at the top of
the Administration, however, and said simply, "Rummy is on
the team. He'd love to see Hezbollah degraded, but he also is
a voice for less bombing and more innovative Israeli ground operations."
The former senior intelligence official similarly depicted Rumsfeld
as being "delighted that Israel is our stalking horse."
There are also questions about the status of Condoleezza Rice.
Her initial support for the Israeli air war against Hezbollah
has reportedly been tempered by dismay at the effects of the attacks
on Lebanon. The Pentagon consultant said that in early August
she began privately "agitating" inside the Administration
for permission to begin direct diplomatic talks with Syria-so
far, without much success. Last week, the Times reported that
Rice had directed an Embassy official in Damascus to meet with
the Syrian foreign minister, though the meeting apparently yielded
no results. The Times also reported that Rice viewed herself as
"trying to be not only a peacemaker abroad but also a mediator
among contending parties" within the Administration. The
article pointed to a divide between career diplomats in the State
Department and "conservatives in the government," including
Cheney and Abrams, "who were pushing for strong American
support for Israel."
The Western diplomat told me his embassy believes that Abrams
has emerged as a key policymaker on Iran, and on the current Hezbollah-Israeli
crisis, and that Rice's role has been relatively diminished. Rice
did not want to make her most recent diplomatic trip to the Middle
East, the diplomat said. "She only wanted to go if she thought
there was a real chance to get a ceasefire."
Bush's strongest supporter in Europe continues to be British Prime
Minister Tony Blair, but many in Blair's own Foreign Office, as
a former diplomat said, believe that he has "gone out on
a particular limb on this"-especially by accepting Bush's
refusal to seek an immediate and total ceasefire between Israel
and Hezbollah. "Blair stands alone on this," the former
diplomat said. "He knows he's a lame duck who's on the way
out, but he buys it"-the Bush policy. "He drinks the
White House Kool-Aid as much as anybody in Washington." The
crisis will really start at the end of August, the diplomat added,
"when the Iranians"-under a United Nations deadline
to stop uranium enrichment-"will say no."
Even those who continue to support Israel's war against Hezbollah
agree that it is failing to achieve one of its main goals-to rally
the Lebanese against Hezbollah. "Strategic bombing has been
a failed military concept for ninety years, and yet air forces
all over the world keep on doing it," John Arquilla, a defense
analyst at the Naval Postgraduate School, told me.
Arquilla has been campaigning for more than a decade, with growing
success, to change the way America fights terrorism. "The
warfare of today is not mass on mass," he said. "You
have to hunt like a network to defeat a network. Israel focussed
on bombing against Hezbollah, and, when that did not work, it
became more aggressive on the ground. The definition of insanity
is continuing to do the same thing and expecting a different result."