
The Iron Triangle
The new military buildup
by James M. Cypher
Dollars and Sense magazine, January/February
2002

The U.S. government's Commission on National Security/21st
Century, convened in October 1998, was a who's who of industry,
government, and military-that is, of the country's power elite.
Former Senators Gary Hart and Warren Rudman chaired the Commission.
Its commissioners included Martin Marietta CEO Norm Augustine
and former House Speaker Newt Gingrich. Its 29 "study group
members" came from top universities like MIT and Princeton,
and think tanks including the RAND Corporation, the Cato Institute,
and the Brookings Institution. The Commission also enjoyed the
cooperation of the Departments of Defense and State, as well as
top intelligence agencies like the CIA and the National Security
Agency (NSA). In 1998, the Commission began a major review of
U.S. military strategy. Its aim? To redesign the institutional
structure of the military for the post-Cold War era.
The Commission's 1999 report New World Coming: American Security
in the 21st Century, outlined a strategy for the United States
to "remain the principal military power in the world."
In the coming century, the report argued, the United States will
become increasingly vulnerable to direct "nontraditional"
attacks-against its information technology infrastructure, for
example. It will have to intervene abroad more frequently to deal
with state fragmentation or to ensure an "uninterrupted"
supply of oil from the Persian Gulf region or elsewhere. And it
will face rivals in its drive to dominate space. The report concluded
that to ensure continued U.S. dominance, U.S. military spending
will have to rise dramatically.
BIG AND HEAVY, FAST AND LIGHT
The Clinton administration, which had overseen a dramatic
decline in military spending over the course of the 1990s, basically
ignored the Commission's conclusions. It now looks, however, like
U.S. military doctrine will follow many of the recommendations
in New World Coming.
The Department of Defense's latest big picture document, the
October 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, aims both to "restore
the defense of the U.S. as the department's primary mission"
and to build forces capable of moving rapidly overseas. Not to
be outdone, the Army has produced two major documents outlining
plans to retain the military's heavy aircraft and tank forces
while developing lighter, faster units that it can deploy virtually
anywhere in the world within 96 hours.
The post-September 11 era of military spending will allow
the Pentagon to have its cake and eat it too-continuing major
Cold War-era weapons systems and funding the cyberage "Revolution
in Military Affairs" (RMA). The RMA emphasizes high-tech
warfare-communications networks, satellites, robot observation
planes, smart bombs, night-vision instruments, highly mobile "light"
armor, and global positioning system (GPS)-equipped soldiers-over
old-fashioned heavy-weapons systems. Many Pentagon officials and
major weapons contractors feared the RMA because it could disrupt
the method of military contracting going back to the beginning
of the Cold War-building a huge arsenal of ships, planes, tanks,
and missiles to confront the Soviet "threat." Military
officials had built their careers on that approach, and weapons
contractors had made many fortunes from the resulting arms contracts.
They feared that the RMA would marginalize them. The novelty of
the Army's approach is to spend enough money to keep everyone
happy, funding the "old military" and the "new
military" alike.
BALANCING THE IRON TRIANGLE
The "Iron Triangle" forms the U.S. military establishment's
decision-making structure and includes its major interest groups.
One side of the triangle includes the "civilian" agencies
that shape U.S. military policy-the Office of the President, the
National Security Council, the Senate and House Armed Services
Committees, and civilian intelligence agencies like the CIA and
NSA. A second side includes the military institutions-the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the top brass of the Air Force, Army, Marines,
and Navy, the powerful "proconsul" regional commands
(known as "CINCs"), and, in a supporting role, veterans'
organizations like the American Legion and the Veterans of Foreign
Wars. At the base of the triangle are the 8S,000 private firms
that profit from the military contracting system, and that use
their sway over millions of defense workers to push for ever-higher
military budgets.
Everyone in the Iron Triangle knew that the Bush Administration
would increase military spending. The question was whether the
increase would be vast enough to fund the old weapons systems,
the "Star Wars" National Missile Defense scheme, and
the RMA. And if not, who would pay the price? On February 13,
2001, President Bush announced that the United States would be
moving beyond the Cold War model and into the RMA. In March 2001,
he submitted a 2002 budget that upped military spending by only
$14 billion over Clinton's 2001 budget. Many powerful members
of the Iron Triangle, who had staked their careers on the old
system, could now foresee their marginalization.
They were not about to go without a fight. Between March and
August 2001, they struggled to save outmoded weapons systems like
the F-22, the most expensive fighter plane in history, and the
plan to build the unreliable V-22 Osprey aircraft, a project that
then-Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney nearly killed eleven years
before. It was, according to The New York Times, a battle "as
intense and intemperate as any in recent memory" within the
Iron Triangle.
Even before September 11, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
advocated a revised military budget with a total spending increase
of $52 billion. He still favored, however, reconfiguring the military
along RMA lines, reducing military units, cutting bases, and retiring
unneeded weapons systems. Even while he proposed the larger spending
increase, Rumsfeld's opponents in the Pentagon succeeded in portraying
him as weak, unfocused, and "spiraling down." Legislators
fought him on base closures, contractors resisted any reduction
in lucrative weapons contracts, the Armed Services fought him
on manpower reductions, and Democrats resisted the National Missile
Defense program -which Rumsfeld had spearheaded.
Post-September 11 emergency spending allocated an additional
$25.5 billion to military objectives. In all, military spending
will rise by at least $58.6 billion over 2001 levels, a 19% increase-just
exceeding Rumsfeld's goal. ("Special Appropriations"
will probably push the basic military budget even higher during
the current fiscal year. ) Now, Rumsfeld will be able to make
a down payment on the RMA, while the vested interests will see
plenty of funds for the old-style "legacy system" military.
Fighter-plane programs will get an incredible $400 billion
in new multi-year contracts. Lockheed Martin will get $225 billion
over 12 years to build nearly 3,000 Joint Strike Fighter planes
for the Air Force, Marines, and Navy. According to Business Week,
Lockheed also stands to make $175 billion in sales to foreign
buyers over the next 25 years. Drowning in its record trade deficit,
the United States desperately needs the boost to the trade balance
provided by arms exports. The Joint Strike Fighter, if it brings
in the expected $175 billion in export sales, may go down in history
as the largest single boost to the balance of payments ever. Currently
the United States controls 50% of the global arms market, with
foreign military sales running at $16.5 billion in 1999. That
figure will be on the rise as new weapons are delivered to Pakistan,
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt.
Looking ahead, the RMA's fantastic weaponry-and its enormous
costs-are only just beginning to emerge. Northrup Grumman, General
Atomics, and Boeing are speeding robot airplanes into production.
Other contractors are developing thermal imaging sensors to "see"
targets through night, distance, fog, and even rock formations.
The Navy is promoting a new destroyer-class warship, the DD-21,
loaded with cruise missiles and guns capable of hitting targets
100 miles inland. Known as the "stealth bomber for the ocean,"
the DD-21 is estimated to cost $24 billion. Cost overruns of 300%
are common, however, so there's no telling what taxpayers will
ultimately pay.
THE ECONOMIC IMPACT
Bush justified his mammoth June 2001 tax cut partially as
a measure to reverse the economic downturn that began the previous
March. In October 2001, he proposed further tax cuts as an "economic
stimulus" package. The two tax cuts combined, however, will
likely provide less of a short-term boost than the nearly $60
billion increase in military spending. Most of the June tax cut
will go to people with high incomes, who tend to spend a smaller
proportion of the additional income they receive from a tax cut.
And a large portion of what they do spend, they tend to spend
on imported luxury goods, rather than domestic goods.
Most of the proposed "stimulus" program suffers
from the same problems, plus a few more. The new proposal also
includes a clause allowing businesses a bigger write-off for equipment
as it decreases in value. But a corporation can take the write-off
while spending on capital depreciation that they would have done
anyway. The same is true of the elimination of the corporate "alternative
minimum tax," which had set a tax "floor" for corporations
no matter how many deductions they could claim. Corporations will
use these windfalls to pay off debt or to invest outside of the
United States.
Compare this to the $60 billion in new military outlays. Most
of this money will go to civilian suppliers who will use it to
pay for domestic labor, materials, and equipment. Only a modest
portion, 5-10%, will leak out of the United States to military
base operations. (Even that may not be as large a "leak"
as it might seem, since base employees stationed overseas often
buy U.S. exports.) Moreover, because of the new emphasis on the
RMA, the military will be buying more newly designed weapons than
it has in a long time, and this will have a strong impact on the
economy.
But will this counter the current recession? University of
Texas economist James K. Galbraith has argued that the United
States will need $600 billion in new spending in 2002 to pull
out of the recession. However, only about $214 billion will come
from increases in emergency and military spending plus the two
tax cuts. Reduced interest rates will also stimulate new spending,
but probably not on the scale required. If Galbraith is correct,
even the massive outlays for the military will fall far short
of the sum needed to turn the U.S. economy around.
What about its long-term effects? Some claim that increased
military spending will drain U.S. productivity and slow long-term
growth. But much of the United States' growth during the post-WWII
period was stimulated by military spending. As Business Week noted
in October 2001:
Defense spending on research and development has sparked much
innovation. Microchips, radar, lasers, satellite communications,
cell phones, GPS, and the Internet all came out of Defense Dept.
funding for basic research at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
Stanford University and national laboratories. There were breakthroughs
at IBM and Bell Laboratories, and all were commercialized by Intel
Corp., Motorola Inc., and other corporations.
The same is true of artificial intelligence, supercomputers, high-speed
fiber optics, and many other breakthroughs. The bulk of information
technologies, in fact, were developed through massive R&D
investments in military technology.
The argument that military spending undercuts productivity
must be seen in a broader context: Conservative economists have
long argued that government spending does not increase investment
because it causes an offsetting reduction in private investment-known
as "crowding out." Some liberal economists have appropriated
this argument to oppose military spending as a drain on the economy.
That argument underestimates the structural importance of military
spending and the arms industry to capitalism. The new military
buildup is not likely to "crowd out" private investment,
but to stimulate investment and technical innovation. The military
buildup will definitely "crowd out," however, spending
on public needs, such as a viable rapid rail system, public education,
and a national health care system-all of which could greatly enhance
productivity. More military spending will focus inordinately on
information technology and other high-tech systems. More artificial
intelligence technologies, global positioning systems, robot planes,
and thermal imaging sensors, however, are not going to house,
educate, or heal people who lack housing, education, or health
care.
81G VISIONS, BIG PLANS
The current military buildup is about much more than countering
the slide in the high-tech sector, or countering the current economic
recession. It is about consolidating the United States' position
as the only superpower. Continued U.S. dominance requires continued
control of the world's most important traded commodity-energy.
The United States imports 52% of the oil, and a growing share
of the natural gas, that it consumes. The profits of oil giants
like Shell, Exxon/Mobil, and Chevron/Texaco come from their global
control of oil and gas resources. Securing this control is one
of the major functions of the U.S. military.
U.S. foreign policy will focus increasingly on securing global
resources, longtime observer and critic of U.S. military affairs
Michael Klare argues in his new book Resource Wars. (This stands
in contrast to the Cold War era, when directly economic motives
were less important to U.S. foreign policy than the superpower
rivalry with the USSR.) The Pentagon and other centers of U.S.
power clearly view Middle East energy resources as a "vital
interest," warranting massive military outlays and the export
of the top-level weapons to client regimes in the region. Between
1990 and 1997, the United States exported $42 billion in arms
to the Persian Gulf states, of which $36 billion went to Saudi
Arabia.
This focus on the oil-exporting regions will only rise under
the Bush administration. Even though the Bushes never really established
themselves in the oil industry, their tilt toward "big energy"
is unmistakable. George W. Bush's number-one corporate donor was
Houston's Enron Corporation, the ill-fated energy trader; Vice
President Dick Cheney comes fresh from his job as CEO of Dallas'
Halliburton Corporation, the world's largest oil-well service
company; and Condoleezza Rice served as a director of the Chevron
Corporation before becoming National Security Advisor.
"Oil runs the world and the Saudis are the linchpin of
oil production," a unnamed senior administration official
told the New York Times in October 2001. The United States has
struggled in the past to reduce its reliance on Middle East oil
supplies-pressuring Mexico and Venezuela to increase production,
hoping for big increases from Colombia's rich oil fields, and
so on. Since 1990, the United States has reduced OPEC oil from
approximately 61% of its total oil imports to 52%-so only about
27% of the oil consumed in the United States now comes from OPEC
(including Venezuela). But this is not the whole story: The United
States has also assumed the role of military guarantor of oil
stability for Europe and Japan. The growing instability of the
Persian Gulf states, in spite of the huge sums that they and the
United States have committed to military defense, portends even
greater U.S. military involvement in the region for the foreseeable
future.
Meanwhile, near the Gulf, two alternative sources of oil are
becoming increasingly attractive-the Caspian Sea region and the
rest of the former USSR. U.S. oil companies are now plunging into
Russia. Halliburton has 300 specialists in Western Siberia struggling
to revive the Samatlor oil field, while Shell and Exxon/Mobil
are investing in a new field off Shakalin Island. Exxon has committed
$5 billion to the effort over the next five years. Russia is now
exporting about 3.3 million barrels a day, nearly half what Saudi
Arabia exports. But if the oil giants invest in new pipelines,
Russian exports could leap to 5.3 million barrels a day by 2004,
according to Business Week. Much of this new oil, and huge quantities
of natural gas-one third of the world's gas reserves are located
in the former Soviet Union-would come from the Caspian Sea region
of Central Asia, the biggest economic prize since the United States
took effective control of Saudi oil in February 1945.
This makes Afghanistan, through which a major Caspian pipeline
would likely run, a strategic linchpin of the global energy industry
and the world economy. U.S., European, and (Russian gas and oil
firms have taken a major interest in the Caspian region's vast
oil and gas reserves since the early l990s. Major pipelines now
carry these resources to Turkey, From which they can be shipped
to Western Europe, the United States, and the rest of the world.
Unocal, Pennzoil, British Petroleum, and Amoco were major participants
in the Azerbaijan International Operating Company (AIOC), a large-scale
project to build pipelines from the Caspian Basin to Turkey and
the Black Sea. Unocal has also proposed a pipeline from Turkmenistan,
Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan through Afghanistan to India and Pakistan,
and to the Pakistan coast for export to China-though the company
now says it has shelved the project. ~
The U.S. military is now developing a long-term presence in
Central Asia, which it will undoubtedly use to secure the rich
supply of Caspian oil and gas. The Pentagon has been courting
the government of Uzbekistan for years, giving its officers military
training in the United States since 1995, and conducting military
exercises in Uzbekistan since 1999. In November 2001, the U.S.
military began negotiating with the government of Tajikistan to
use former Soviet military bases there during the U.S. war in
Afghanistan. Considering that a U.S. garrison has been permanently
stationed in Saudi Arabia since the Gulf War, it seems unlikely
that the U.S. military will leave either Uzbekistan or Tajikistan
after the Afghanistan war.
The outcome of this high-stakes struggle remains to be seen.
Russia and the Caspian region resemble the Persian Gulf region
in their fragile social foundations. So shifting to the former
for imported oil and gas will not eliminate the United States'
reliance for energy on states with huge potential for instability.
If an Afghanistan pipeline is ever built, however, it will help
give U.S. and Russian oil interests leverage they have not had
in decades over the Persian Gulf region, just by making the Gulf's
oil supplies a much smaller part of global production. Moreover,
with energy demand in developing Asia predicted to surpass that
of North America by 2020, it will give the United States added
leverage over these economies. The current U.S. power play in
Central Asia, in short, dramatically increases the likelihood
that the U.S. military will succeed in achieving the goals articulated
by the Commission on National Security/21st Century-securing control
of the global energy supply, and maintaining the United States'
position as the world's only superpower.
James M. Cypher teaches economics at California State University,
Fresno.
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