
The globalizer who came in from the cold: Joseph
Stiglitz
by Gregory Palast
International Socialist Review, Aug/Sep 2001

"It has condemned people to death," the former apparatchik
told me. It was like a scene out of Le Carre. The brilliant old
agent comes in from the cold, crosses to our side, and in hours
of debriefing, empties his memory of horrors committed in the
name of a political ideology he now realizes has gone rotten.
But this was a far bigger catch than some used Cold War spy. Joseph
Stiglitz was chief economist of the World Bank. To a great extent,
the new world economic order was his theory come to life.
He is in Washington for this week's Spring Ministerial, the
big confab of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund
(IMF). But instead of chairing the meetings of ministers and central
bankers, Stiglitz was kept outside the blue police cordons the
same as the nuns carrying a large wooden cross, the Bolivian union
leaders, the parents of AIDS victims, and the other "antiglobalization"
protesters.
Two years ago, the World Bank fired Stiglitz. He was not allowed
quiet retirement; the U.S. treasury secretary demanded a public
excommunication for Stiglitz's having expressed his first mild
dissent from globalization World Bank style.
Here in Washington, we completed the last of several hours
of exclusive interviews with Stiglitz for the Observer and BBC
TV's "Newsnight" about the real, inside workings of
the IMF, World Bank, and the Bank's 51 percent owner, the U.S.
Treasury.
And here, from sources unnamable (not Stiglitz), we obtained
a cache of documents marked "confidential," "restricted,"
and "not otherwise (to be) disclosed without World Bank authorization."
Stiglitz helped to translate one from bureaucratese, a "Country
Assistance Strategy." There's an assistance strategy for
every poorer nation, designed, says the World Bank, after careful
in-country investigation. But according to insider Stiglitz, the
Bank's staff" investigation" consists of close inspection
of a nation's five-star hotels. It concludes with the Bank staff
meeting a begging, busted finance minister who is handed a "restructuring
agreement" pre-drafted for his "voluntary" signature.
Each nation's economy is individually analyzed. Then, says
Stiglitz, the Bank hands every minister the same exact four-step
program. Step one is privatization-which Stiglitz said could more
accurately be called "briberization." Rather than object
to the sell-offs of state industries, he said national leaders-using
the World Bank's demands to silence local critics-happily flogged
their electricity and water companies. "You could see their
eyes widen" at the prospect of 10 percent commissions paid
to Swiss bank accounts for simply shaving a few billion off the
sale price of national assets. And the U.S. government knew it,
charges Stiglitz, at least in the case of the biggest "briberization"
of all, the 1995 Russian sell-off. "The U.S. Treasury view
was this was great, as we wanted Yeltsin reelected. We don't care
if it's a corrupt election. We want the money to go to Yeltsin"
via kickbacks for his campaign. Stiglitz is no conspiracy nutter
ranting about Black Helicopters. The man was inside the game,
at that time a member of Bill Clinton's cabinet as chairman of
the president's council of economic advisers.
Most ill-making for Stiglitz is that the U.S.-backed oligarchs
stripped Russia's industrial assets, with the effect that the
corruption scheme cut national output nearly in half After briberization,
step two of the IMF/World Bank one-size-fits-all rescue-your-economy
plan is "capital market liberalization." In theory,
capital market deregulation allows investment capital to flow
in and out.
Unfortunately, as in Indonesia and Brazil, the money simply
flowed out and out. Stiglitz calls this the "hot money"
cycle. Cash comes in for speculation in real estate and currency,
then flees at the first whiff of trouble. A nation's reserves
can drain in days, hours. And when that happens, to seduce speculators
into returning a nation's own capital funds, the IMF demands these
nations raise interest rates to 30 percent, 50 percent, and 80
percent.
"The result was predictable," said Stiglitz of the
hot money tidal waves in Asia and Latin America. Higher interest
rates demolished property values, savaged industrial production,
and drained national treasuries. At this point, the IMF drags
the gasping nation to step three: market-based pricing, a fancy
term for raising prices on food, water, and cooking gas. This
leads, predictably, to step-three-and-a-half: what Stiglitz calls
"the IMF riot."
The IMF riot is painfully predictable. When a nation is "down
and out, [the IMF] takes advantage and squeezes the last pound
of blood out of them. They turn up the heat until, finally, the
whole cauldron blows up," as when the IMF eliminated food
and fuel subsidies for the poor in Indonesia in 1998.
Indonesia exploded into riots, but there are other examples-the
Bolivian riots over water prices last year and, this February,
the riots in Ecuador over the rise in cooking-gas prices imposed
by the World Bank. You'd almost get the impression that the riot
is written into the plan.
And it is. What Stiglitz did not know is that, while in the
States, "Newsnight" obtained several documents from
inside the World Bank, stamped over with those pesky warnings
"confidential," "restricted," "not to
be disclosed." In one, last year's "Interim Country
Assistance Strategy" for Ecuador, the Bank several times
refers-with cold accuracy-that the plans could be expected to
spark "social unrest," to use their bureaucratic term
for a nation in flames.
That's not surprising. The secret report notes that the plan
to make the U.S. dollar Ecuador's currency has pushed 51 percent
of the population below the poverty line. The World Bank "assistance"
plan simply calls for facing down civil strife and suffering with
"political resolve"-and still higher prices.
The IMF riots (and by "riots" I mean peaceful demonstrations
dispersed by bullets, tanks, and tear gas) cause new panicked
flights of capital and government bankruptcies. This economic
arson has it's bright side-for foreigners, who can then pick off
remaining assets, such as the odd mining concession or port, at
fire-sale prices.
Stiglitz notes that the IMF and World Bank are not heartless
adherents to market economics. While stopping Indonesia from subsidizing
food purchases, "when the banks need a bailout, intervention
(in the market) is welcome." The IMF scrounged up nearly
$100 billion to save Indonesia's financiers and, by extension,
the U.S. and European banks from which they had borrowed. A pattern
emerges. There are lots of losers in this system but one clear
winner: the Western banks and U.S. Treasury, making the big bucks
off this crazy new international capital churn. Stiglitz told
me about his unhappy meeting, early in his World Bank tenure,
with Ethiopia's new democratic president. The World Bank and IMF
had ordered Ethiopia to divert aid money to its reserve account
at the U.S. Treasury, which pays a pitiful 4 percent return, while
the nation borrowed U.S. dollars at 12 percent to feed its population.
Now, we arrive at step four of what the IMF and World Bank
call their "poverty reduction strategy": free trade.
This is free trade by the rules of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) and World Bank, which Stiglitz, the insider, likens to the
Opium Wars. "That too was about opening markets," he
said. As in the nineteenth century, Europeans and Americans today
are kicking down the barriers to sales in Asia, Latin America,
and Africa, while barricading our own markets against Third World
agriculture. In the Opium Wars, the West used military blockades
to force open markets for unbalanced trade. Today, the World Bank
can order a financial blockade, which is just as effective and
sometimes just as deadly.
Stiglitz is particularly emotional over the WTO's intellectual
property rights treaty, which goes by the acronym "TRIPS."
It is here, says the economist, that the new global order has
"condemned people to death" by imposing impossible tariffs
and tributes to pay to pharmaceutical companies for branded medicines.
By the way, don't be confused by the mix of the IMF World
Bank, and WTO. They are interchangeable masks of a single governance
system. They have locked themselves together by what are unpleasantly
called "triggers." Taking a World Bank loan for a school
"triggers" a requirement to accept every "conditionality"-they
average 111 per nation- laid down by both the World Bank and IMF,
including trade policies more punitive than [those of the] WTO.
Stiglitz's greatest concern is that World Bank plans, devised
in secrecy and driven by an absolutist ideology, are never open
for discourse or dissent. Despite the West's push for elections
throughout the developing world, the so-called Poverty Reduction
Programs "undermine democracy." And they don't work.
Black Africa's productivity under the guiding hand of IMF structural
"assistance" has gone to hell in a handbag, the continent's
income dropping 23 percent in the past two decades.
Did any nation avoid this fate? Yes, said Stiglitz, identifying
Botswana. Their trick? "They told the IMF to go packing."
So then I turned on Stiglitz. OK, Mr. Smart-Guy Professor, how
would you help developing nations? Stiglitz proposed radical land
reform, an attack at the heart of "landlordism" on the
usurious rents charged by the propertied oligarchies worldwide,
typically 50 percent of a tenant's crops. So I had to ask the
professor: As you were top economist at the World Bank, why didn't
the Bank follow your advice? "If you challenge [land ownership],
that would be a change in the power of the elites. That's not
high on their agenda." Apparently not.
Ultimately, what drove him to put his job on the line was
the failure of the banks and U.S. Treasury to change course when
confronted with the crises-failures and suffering perpetrated
by their four-step monetarist mambo. Every time their free-market
solutions failed, the IMF simply demanded more free-market policies.
"It's a little like the Middle Ages," the insider told
me. "When the patient died they would say, 'Well, he stopped
the bloodletting too soon, he still had a little blood in him."'
So the solution to world poverty and crisis, then, is simple:
Remove the bloodsuckers.
Gregory Palast is an award-winning reporter who writes the
"Inside Corporate America" column for the Observer (London).
His column and contact information are available at www.GregPalast.com.
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