excerpts from the book

Fortress America

by William Greider

PublicAffairs Press, 1998



The vast industrial structure required to support and supply the armed forces ... continues in place with massive capabilities, still inventing and producing, still imagining a next generation of advanced weaponry that can prevail over [an] unnamed future enemy.

Congress, two presidents, the public at large, and both political parties have all seemed to find nothing strange in this. America remains expensively ready for war. No one in authority dares question this, and the public does not ask: to what end?



The parking lots of armor reflect, crudely, the great national dilemma we are evading. America is experiencing a deep confusion of purpose at this moment of history, holding on to a past that is defunct, but unable to imagine a different future. The Cold War is over, but not really, not yet.

Too many tanks with nowhere to send them. Too many bombers and fighter planes, too many ships and rockets. Too many men and women in uniform. Our troops are the best in the world, splendidly trained and capable, brilliantly equipped with dazzling weaponry. But what exactly are they to do, now that a general peace is upon us? We don't know the answer. We don't even want to talk about it.

The defense budget has been reduced since the Berlin Wall came down eight years ago, but $250 billion is still much larger (even after allowing for inflation) than in I980, the height of Cold War tensions. Overall troop strength has been downsized by roughly one-third, but the nation continues to maintain the heavied-up military force designed and equipped to go head to head against the Soviets. That force structure anticipated a full-scale war waged across the plains of Central Europe-across many of the nations of Central Europe now poised to join NATO.

Fortress America remains mobilized to fight the big one but justifies itself now with vague threat scenarios that envision fighting two wars at once, twin regional conflicts that will be smaller in scale but simultaneous. Instead of a robust debate over new priorities or skeptical questioning of these fanciful premises, the political elites in both parties have settled into denial and drift-a status quo that argues only over smaller matters, like which new weapon systems to fund and where they will be built. Defense spending, as one strategic analyst put it, has become "the new third rail of American politics." Most politicians are afraid to touch it.

It seems improbable that Americans will wish to spend more on a peacetime mobilization, not when federal spending is being cut for nearly everything else. Indeed, the public is inclined right now to stand clear of foreign engagements, especially ones that might involve American casualties. Despite the official projections, most analysts expect defense spending to remain flat or even decline further.

But unwilling or unable to adapt to the new circumstances, the armed forces and their allied manufacturers are proceeding with ambitious plans based on the assumption that the reduction in defense spending is only temporary and that Pentagon budgets will soon begin rising robustly again. (The Clinton administration assumes the same: its five-year projections call for another $30 billion and a 40 percent increase in the procurement budget, while Republicans seek even more.)

Until more money arrives, the defense apparatus is literally feeding on its own parts, pinching this and that, scrimping here and there, in order to keep the same Cold War force structure in place and the same lineup of new weapons moving through the pipeline of development. During the Cold War era, the military institution acquired a reflexive appetite for growth that it's now unwilling to give up. Instead, it lumbers toward a self-induced crisis of malnourishment, as when an addict's starving body eats its own liver.

Some smart people, in and out of the Pentagon, see what's coming and have proposed various blueprints for fundamental restructuring and drastic reduction. Radical alternatives are shrugged off by political and military leaders, however, not to mention the defense industry. It is not necessary to study the mind-numbing budget projections to see the problem. The outlines are visible in the routine facts of military life, the daily burden of maintaining the best and biggest army, navy, and air force in the world.


The Pentagon has been dumping old tanks like an army-navy surplus store conducting frantic "going out of business" sales. Giving them away to friendly nations. Selling them at deep discounts. Offering them free to local museums. It dumped one hundred old Sherman M-60s into Mobile Bay off the Alabama coast to form artificial reefs for fish in the Gulf of Mexico. Several hundred more are being sunk along other coastlines for the same purpose. One year it gave forty-five tanks free to Bosnia and another fifty to Jordan. It shipped ninety-one tanks to Brazil under a no-cost, five-year lease, and thirty to Bahrain on the same terms. Another I60 tanks were sold to Taiwan for $I30,000 each, priced at ten cents on the dollar. Egypt got seven hundred free by picking up transportation costs.

One way or another, the Army has disposed of nearly six thousand older tanks during the last six years. Giving them away "is often cheaper than destroying or storing them," Lora Lumpe and Paul F. Pineo explained in a I997 study by the Federation of American Scientists. In the I980s, they observed dryly, the United States spent many billions on modernizing the Army's entire inventory of armor, helicopters, artillery, and other gear. In the I990s, it unloaded "a literal army" composed of the same stuff, albeit usually older models. Plus there are the hundreds of "excess" aircraft and ships from the Air Force and Navy inventories.

"The services appear to be giving away still useful equipment in order to justify procurement of new weaponry," Lumpe and Pineo asserted. "Much of the equipment now declared 'excess' is quite serviceable. In fact, a lot of it was purchased or reconditioned in the Reagan arms build-up of the I980s." These bargain sales have not provoked much controversy, except for occasional complaints from defense firms trying to sell new armaments to the same countries.



Next year, the keel will be laid for another new carrier, the Ronald Reagan, which is likely to cost $5 billion. Does anyone dare ask whether America actually needs this aircraft carrier called Ronald Reagan?



This spring, Lockheed Martin rolled out the first model of the F-22 at its plant in Marietta, Georgia, and staged an official celebration of the plane that is said to ensure "air dominance" in the twenty-first century. The F-22 was conceived and designed in the I9805 to meet the Soviet threat that Pentagon planners projected for the mid-1990s. And so it will, despite the awkward fact that the Soviet Union no longer exists.

Each F-22 will cost $I6I million (assuming the cost estimates are accurate and honest), and the Air Force wants to buy around 438 of them, a future commitment of $70 billion.

The Navy, meanwhile, is replacing its aircraft, too. The new F/A-I8 E/F fighter-bombers, to be built by Boeing, will cost $80 million each-a lot less than the F-22, but the Navy intends to buy 1,000 of them, a commitment of $80 billion.

The Army, for its part, has a $4S billion program under way to acquire I,292 new Commanche armed reconnaissance helicopters.

The armed services are together also purchasing $76 billion in precision-guided bombs plus new equipment for air defense and close artillery support. That's roughly $300 billion in better weaponry for the future. But there's more.

The Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps are collaborating on the creation of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), a swept-wing aircraft so versatile it will fill the future tactical needs of all three services, even the vertical takeoff capacity the Marines want. A competition is under way among the major defense contractors, Lockheed Martin, Boeing, and others, to see who will win this prize. The stakes are huge, since total acquisition costs are likely to exceed $300 billion. A decade from now, when the JSF rolls out, the services promise to buy 2,978 of them.

Before any of these new weapons systems are produced, however, another awkward fact still stalks the Air Force, Army, and Navy: the excess of lethality that exists right now. Even if one takes seriously the scenarios for fighting two wars at once, the armed services have a surplus of killing power. Gross reductions have been made-tanks, ships, and planes removed from the active inventory. But a lot of new stuff has also been purchased. Procurements that were planned in the Cold War days rolled forward anyway, after the bear's demise.

Since 1991, the General Accounting Office (GAO) calculates, the Pentagon has tripled its inventory of long-range missiles to attack ground targets (and upgraded many older missiles). After the Cold War ended, the government added 2,662 Tomahawks and other missiles to its arsenal. It increased air power capabilities by modernizing 96I night-capable aircraft and 707 precision-guided munitions-capable aircraft.

The Air Force has so many long-range bombers-the old reliable B-52, the troubled B-I, the new, stealthy B-2 that costs $2 billion apiece-that it cannot afford to keep them all in the air. Yet, if you can believe its plans, the Air Force intends to increase the operational bomber force 25 percent by 200I.

The B-I bomber is the Cold War's most celebrated white elephant. I saw some in training at Ells worth Air Force Base in South Dakota and felt sympathy for the dilemma of pilots and commanders there. The nation spent hundreds of billions building and deploying one hundred B-1s. (Four have since crashed.) The plane is designed for intercontinental nuclear strikes deep inside the Soviet Union, a mission that no longer exists. They are being converted to conventional bombs but were not sent to the Gulf War.

The B-1s charter is reduced to flying occasional "global power missions," whatever that means. Because they are so expensive to operate, twenty-seven of the B-I fleet were put in "reconstitution reserve status." That is, they have no crews assigned to fly them. However, the Air Force intends to activate them again as soon as it can find the money.

Bottom line: a staggering target overkill exists in Fortress America, even for fighting two wars at once. The GAO has documented the redundancies in a I996 study:

The services already have at least 10 ways to hit 65 percent of the thousands of expected ground targets in two major regional conflicts. In addition, service interdiction assets can provide I40 to I60 percent coverage for many types of targets. Despite their numerous overlapping, often redundant, interdiction capabilities, the services plan to acquire aircraft and other weapons over the next 15 to 20 years that will further enhance their interdiction capabilities.



The juggernaut - the best and biggest military force in the world - lumbers on, doing what it knows how to do best. It is unwilling to rethink its future, unable to let go of the past. Like the shark, it must keep feeding, only now it is feeding on itself.



The war [WWII] also created the mixed marriage of government and private enterprise that is with us still: a huge and diverse manufacturing sector dedicated to serving one customer-the Department of Defense. It includes thousands of small and | medium-sized firms and a handful of mammoth corporations that are the prime contractors. All are deeply dependent on politics to fill their order books.

President Dwight D. Eisenhower, the general who commanded the military victory over Hitler, labeled it the "military-industrial complex" and warned against its encroaching influence. Critics later coined an ominous metaphor-the Iron Triangle-to explain its political power. The three sides of the triangle are formed by Congress, the defense companies, and the military leadership-three power centers that interact to reinforce their mutual interests: jobs, contracts, new weaponry.

When other nations employ such tactics to advance their own economic development, American commentators typically deride the arrangement as "state socialism" and warn that it will generate wasteful inefficiencies and entrenched interests that will become very difficult to dislodge. The U.S. arms industry has done both (while also spawning spectacular innovations in the technologies of war-making), but conservatives do not put a socialist label on the government-business marriage that supports the arms industry since it serves the high purpose of defending the nation. And in industrial terms, the nation never truly demobilized after World War II. Scores of the major factories and shipyards that Washington had built for contractors to operate remained in place, though producing at much lower levels. (Fifty years later, the government still owns more than sixty of those factories, and they are still operated by private firms.)

The shock of Pearl Harbor left a political conviction that the United States must never be caught flatfooted again. Keep the defense industrial base "warm," ready to make new weapons again, just in case. After I948, when Cold War was joined with the Soviets, arms production flourished anew. The ensuing five decades of permanent war mobilization have been an era unlike any other time in American history.



The awesome industrial base that America built to win World War II and then the Cold War has now emerged as the premier arms merchant to the world. With our government's encouragement and subsidy, the industry sells advanced U.S. weapons to developing countries that wish to be regarded as "developed." Objections that this arms traffic is sowing future conflict rather than peace are brushed aside.



The Iron Triangle is a powerful fraternity, but its three sides are also in continuous struggle with one another. One firm is fat and happy with new contracts while another is starving. Politicians compete for the projects that put jobs in their districts while admirals and generals argue over which hardware should be funded for their branch. Contractors complain about the Pentagon's ham-handed procurement rules-devised by military procurement officers who have been burned by the companies' cost overruns and other forms of gouging. Incredibly tangled alliances develop among these players to advance their own aspirations.



When peace arrived, the swords were not beaten into plowshares, as the prophet Isaiah envisioned. The swords, one might say, were beaten into capital gains. A "peace dividend" did appear after the Cold War ended. It was distributed to shareholders of the major defense companies.


The Pentagon is now effectively married to an oligopoly of three mammoth corporations and obliged to keep them in good health - McDonnell Douglas -Boeing, Lockheed - Martin Marietta and Raytheon - Hughes Electronics.


The unstated political objective [of expanding NATO] is to open new markets for the American arms industry.



The end of the Cold War rivalry has (n fact)opened a fierce new global competition among the arms makers-American, European, and Russian. They are competing now for customers that were once off limits to them, and all are struggling with the same fundamental problem of how to keep their factories going in a shrinking market. The overcapacity problems facing the U.S. industry are even more severe for Western European companies-and overwhelming for the old Soviet weapons industry.

NATO expansion is the visible expression of the arms race that is under way, not among; warring nations, but among the anxious manufacturers confronted with peace. Since the end of the Cold War, the volume of international arms sales has not increased, but the U.S. share of the global market has gone up, while Russia's share has shrunk drastically. LockMartin's overseas business, for instance, went from 5 percent to I8 percent of its total sales in just five years. Central Europe offers a market of two hundred fighters over the next five years-$8 billion to $10 billion in scarce orders.

"We will certainly fight to sell aircraft to Poland and Hungary, Romania, and what not," says Joel Johnson of the Aerospace Industries Association. "Everybody and his uncle wants to do that. These countries aren't going to increase their defense spending, but they want to shift from Russian to Western suppliers. If there's any rationale for NATO, it is that we want them to have compatibility with our weapons."

Poland's air force, for instance, consists of 437 Soviet-made combat aircraft, and it wants to replace 100 of them. But should it buy F-I6s from Lockheed Martin or F-I8s from Boeing? The French Mirage or the JAS-39 from Saab and British Aerospace? All are competing for the sale; even Russia is offering Poland bargain-priced MIG-29s. LockMartin is proposing an industrial "partnership" to help Poland offset its costs. The U.S. Air Force, meanwhile, is offering to set up aerospace management centers in Central Europe. The Navy has suggested leasing some of its F-I8s to Poland.

The Pentagon and the industry, in other words, are jointly promoting American-made weapons, and with considerable success. In I995 U.S. producers delivered $I2 billion in weapons to foreign buyers, three-fourths of them destined for developing nations. The U.S. volume represents 44 percent of the global market, more than double America's market share in I990 when the Soviet Union was the leading exporter of arms. Now Russia is a weak third, behind Great Britain.

America's head start in selling arms to the new NATO members helps explain why the other major allies are unenthused about paying for the alliance's expansion-a burden variously estimated from $z7 billion to $I25 billion. France's President Jacques Chirac has said that France will not devote a single franc more to the enterprise. Now that the Cold War is over, Chirac observed, "I don't know why the defense of the alliance should cost more than it did then." German Chancellor Helmut Kohl complained that "it is completely absurd to link NATO enlargement with cost factors as if the aim is to rearm large areas of Europe to the teeth." Both Kohl and Chirac have made unsubtle suggestions that the American motive for expanding NATO is selling weapons.



Defense spending bv Latin American nations has increased by ~t percent since I992, while their economies have grown by 22 percent. No one quite knows why these countries feel so threatened, but perhaps they have come to feel threatened by each other.

One obvious danger of distributing so much advanced weaponry among so many scattered nations is that someday, in unforeseeable ways, this hardware may be facing us on the battlefield. The ideological boundaries of the Cold War imposed some arbitrary limits on who could sell to whom. Without those inhibitions, the arms marketplace is becoming truly global.

As Professor William Keller describes it in "Arm in Arm", the casual trade by Western arms producers in the Middle East laid the groundwork for Saddam Hussein's aggression and led tO Desert Storm. Iraq, after all, bought its advanced weaponry from many sources, including U.S. allies like France. "The whole point of the Gulf War," Keller says, "was that we did what we had to do because of the errors we committed in the past."

Industry people respond with a shrug. They claim to be selling security and stable friendship, not future adversaries. Besides, if we don't sell stuffto Indonesia or Thailand or whomever, then somebody else will. Bob Paulson gives a concise summary of the industry rationale: "If we don't sell it to them, will the French? Yes. If If they buy our weapons, will we exercise more control over them? Possibly. Are we putting machine guns in the hands of some savages? Perhaps. But someone will if we don't."



"Using arms exports as a way to maintain defense industrial capacity is a particularly irrational policy," Michael Oden has argued. "A Lockheed official recently testified that the U.S. has to make a multibillion-dollar commitment to the F-22 to counter the widespread proliferation of higher-performance combat aircraft such as the U.S.-made F-I5 and F-I6.... This argument suggests that, with the fall of the Soviet Union, we are effectively engaging in an arms race with ourselves."



... If the arms makers do succeed in globalizing, the political implications are profound. "If the defense industrial base becomes truly international," Professor Keller warns, "then you are rupturing the relationship between the government and the industrial part of its national security apparatus. The strategy assumes that these defense firms are private companies when they are really creations of the state. Now the government is saying: 'We can't afford you guys any longer.' So the companies say, 'Okay, we're consolidating and going global. That way you can have new weapons at cheaper prices.' But the new question will be: Which government is the client? What if a government wants a company to do something that doesn't make good business sense and the company says no? What do you do if you have a company fully globalized and willing to sell weapons to any

. .As U.S. commercial companies have globalized their operations, their loyalties to the nation-and to the workforce back home-have steadily weakened. What Keller suggests is that the same trend is now beginning among the arms makers, but with much more dangerous potential. Imagine a military-industrial complex that is truly multinational in scope and scale and able to play governments off against each other. Imagine a global arms market that claims to be above and beyond the political control of mere nations. These prospects are only theoretical at present, but one can hear their global dreams in the hopeful expressions of the leading executives.

Norman Augustine promises: "We're serious about being a global company, and that means expanding our workforce outside the United States."

Philip Condit, chairman of Boeing, tells the Financial Times of London that, twenty years hence, people will think of Boeing as a global company, not an American company, and he acknowledges the national security problem that a globalized arms firm creates: "Because we are a U.S. defense contractor, our board members will have to have security clearance. As we move in an international direction, we will have to find ways-the U.S. government will have to find ways-of dealing with that."

Boeing's new head of military sales, Alan Mullay, rhapsodizes over the corporate vision for global peace. "What's really cool about defense," Mullaly tells the Economist, "is that it will no longer be about defending America, but about making the world safe."



... the benefits of defense spending are becoming more and more concentrated in a few states-Georgia, Texas, California. The competition for foreign sales and global partners drives the companies to move more and more of their production offshore rather than rehire idle machinists or engineers at home. Finally, the money that pays for more bombers that the nation doesn't need must come out of the budget for something else-schools. highways, health ...



Confronted with peace and deprived of a convincing enemy, the military imagination leaps ahead to fight the next war. Across many centuries, this has always been the case between the big wars. Peace is an anxious lull when warrior dreams are agitated by techno-visionaries and the industrial ambitions of weapons-makers. Sometimes they get it right, and the result is a fundamental breakthrough in war-fighting, like radar or rocket engines.

Sometimes the triumphant generals become so enthralled by their own sense of superiority that the magnificent delusions they construct eventually destroy them. After World War I, the victorious French Army built the fortifications known as the Maginot Line and declared that this innovation would repel German invasions for all time. Hitler sent his tanks around it and marched straight into Paris. Peacetime, in other words, can be dangerous for a nation if it fosters illusions of invincibility.

In any case, designing the war of the future sets up another point of collision with the past. Even if futuristic ideas prove to be sound, the Pentagon and the arms industry are still reluctant to give up what already exists-the vast arsenal of conventional overkill. They cannot have it both ways, one would think, but so far they are doing their best to accomplish just that, with very little resistance from the political system. So the process of elaborating a future world of utterly new war-fighting weapons proceeds, even as companies prepare to turn out new generations of the conventional, and even as the armed services struggle to maintain readiness with the existing arsenal.

Right now, the American military establishment claims to be in the midst of a "revolution in military affairs" (or RMA, in the Pentagon's shorthand). This technological upheaval, it is said, will transform every aspect of warfare and eclipse most of the conventional armaments that now exist. The Army's effort to create "wired" ground forces is only one dimension of RMA, a modest first step toward much larger concepts. The inspiration, of course, is the industrial revolution in global commerce-the efficiency and precision made possible by the new electronic technologies. The high-tech vision was made more fashionable by the U.S. victory in the Gulf War, with its video clips of precision bombing and scant American casualties.

War will become "capital-intensive and automated," as one analyst puts it. Instead of nose-to-nose ground battle between contending armies, the action will become increasingly long-range, dispersed, and depersonalized-fought with deep-strike precision missiles, information dominance, even space-based weaponry (though now prohibited by treaty) using exotic energy forces like particle beams to kill or immobilize. As the electronic systems take over war-fighting roles, the human ranks in uniform will be downsized-just like civilian workforces- and the fighters will need to become much smarter.

"The future Army will really need sort of super-soldiers who can operate in this really difficult environment-not just fighting other soldiers but also fighting the other side's system, which can now 'acquire' them at greater range," says Michael G. Vickers, director of strategic studies at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, a Pentagon-financed think tank in Washington. "I served on a Defense Science Board study last year that looked at this issue: could five thousand men do what fifty thousand men did before? Not in all cases, but with the right things, you could substitute automation for these large forces. Then maybe a soldier will need to fight in much smaller groups. But he will control more territory than he could in the past."

In this scenario, for instance, micro-robots become scouts and even the warriors - miniaturized mechanical creatures that carry sensors forward into difficult, dangerous terrain and someday guns or explosives. "These things are on the horizon right now," Vickers says. "Some of them look kind of like Slinkies. They have an easy locomotion and can crawl pretty good and go over rough stuff and into small places. So in a high-end war, the super-soldiers might number only fifty thousand, but you still might have a four-hundred-thousand-man army because your support requirements go up as you get more technical. Even if the robots and all that stuff are your war-fighters, someone's got to maintain these things.

Saddam Hussein's ill-fated venture in Kuwait demonstrated that the traditional tank invasion is indeed obsolete-if the other side has air superiority and high-tech dominance in electronic intelligence and precision missiles. But the Gulf War also prompted chilling reflection among U.S. military thinkers: maybe these same technological elements will someday make our weapons obsolete, too. The so-called platforms that carry the firepower and are the backbone of modern warfare-tanks, surface ships, and aircraft-are all vulnerable in different ways to deep-strike weapons and electronic surveillance systems. If a cruise missile can take out Iraqi tanks, why not American aircraft carriers? Or air bases? Or cities?

Good grief. Maybe America isn't ready for the next war, after all-despite its burgeoning arsenal, despite the $250 billion it spends every year on defense, and despite the fact that no other industrial nation challenges U.S. status as the world's only superpower. The thought excites a search for exotic new forms of armaments.

The Navy dreamed up the arsenal ship-a huge barge that carries five hundred missiles and looks like the Monitor and the Merrimac, the original ironclad ships that first dueled during the American Civil War. Its supposed advantage is that vast firepower can be floated around the world with a crew of only fifty, compared to fifty-five hundred on an aircraft carrier.

The downside eventually dawned on naval planners: this barge would be just as vulnerable as the carriers already are. Maybe it could somehow be made "stealthy" and elude radar, like the B-2 bomber. Vickers says Europeans are experimenting with the idea of generating ocean mists to protect ships from easy detection. If that doesn't work, then the arsenal barge might have to be submersible-that is, a huge submarine loaded with hundreds of missiles. This sounds a lot like the preexisting Trident submarine.

The Air Force imagines opportunity in the high-tech threat. With the use of space sensors, stealth, and other innovations, it is trying once again to claim a preeminent role for air power and suggesting, none too subtly, that ground and naval forces will soon be obsolete. (Military pilots have been making this argument, unsuccessfully, for approximately seventy years.) On the other hand, Air Force officers are aghast at the suggestion that future wars will not require even pilots.

Lockheed Martin circulates an artist's rendering of the fighter plane of the future-it looks just like the F-I6 the company already manufactures at its Fort Worth plant. The only differences are that the sleek, gray plane in the illustration carries twelve air-to-air missiles under its wings (an F-I6 can carry only four at most) and there's no pilot, only smooth fuselage where the cockpit is supposed to be. It's called the UCAV (Uninhabited Combat Aircraft Vehicle). Other major defense companies are working on their own conceptions of the same product.

"I'm a technologist, an engineer," says Lockheed's Dr. Armand J. Chaput as he explains the UCAV's potential. "My job is not to determine what the government wants but what the government will need and will want only it doesn't know it yet." The armed services are developing larger long-distance reconnaissance planes that fly without pilots, so the logical next step is to outfit similar unmanned aircraft with missiles or bombs. The UCAVs will have "pilots," but they sit safely on the ground, "flying" the aircraft from a computer terminal back at the air base.

"The concept of war is different now," Chaput explains. "The kind of war you become involved in now is where the national image is at stake and not necessarily the national security. So you want to be present and engaged, but for God's sake, don't let any American boys and girls get killed. The other constraint is the budget: how do you do more with less? The concept of UCAV didn't have anything to do with fighter planes at first. It was about developing reusable weapons."

"There's a market niche for the UCAV between the Tomahawk cruise missile and fighter planes," he explains. The cruise missiles are a very expensive way to deliver explosives to a target-about $I,500 per pound for the Tomahawk. But the government "is still going to want to use them, because no pilots will be lost of captured," Chaput says. "It's kind of the CNN factor." A UCAV will perform the same role as a cruise missile, but after it dumps its explosives, it can fly home to be used again.

By Lockheed's calculations, the cost of operations and ground support could be drastically reduced if the Air Force shifted battlefield bombing to these riderless drones. While operating a squadron of fighter planes consumes $50 million, an equivalent force of UCAVs modeled on the F-I6 would cost only $I0 million. A smaller version of the UCAV with a flying-wing design would operate even more cheaply. Not everyone, however, buys the optimistic economic analysis.

"The problem is, they're just wildly expensive, incredibly expensive," insists William D. O Neil, vice president of the Center for Naval Analyses and himself a former director of strategic planning at Lockheed. For one thing, the average UAV only lasts about ten flights. We've been flying them for years, and we've got data. When you're flying an airplane, you have lots of little things go wrong, and without thinking about it, you adjust and compensate for the problems. But the UAV doesn't do that. The UAV will just continue according to its program as it spirals out of control. So they crash at a great rate. They like to talk about UAVs that will only cost $I million, but tit only lasts ten flights, that's $I00,000 per flight."



The abstract logic of fighting future wars with revolutionary new technologies has a pristine, bloodless quality that is attractive. The trouble is that real war is never so neat and always bloody...

"I go on the talk shows all the time," [John] McCain says. "You start talking about national defense or foreign policy, the lines don't light up. Talk about Medicaid, Social Security, IRS, taxes- bang!-they all want to be heard."

... most Americans don't care. The Cold War is over. There's no perceived threat, the economy is good. Fewer and fewer Americans join the military. Politicians naturally gravitate to what interests their constituents. Because the people don't care, there's all sorts of political mischief being performed. And we're not making the transition to the post-Cold War era."

The senator's website shows a pig rolling a barrel of dollars across the screen-the political pork that gets tucked into annual defense appropriations bills and that he tries to knock out. (President Clinton also eliminated some with his line-item veto, which has now, however, been declared unconstitutional.) Congress each year commits billions more than the Pentagon has requested, especially in election years. It refuses to close any more military bases and protects civilian employees at inefficient arsenals and depots. It finds the cash for expensive relics from the Cold War while it shrinks federal programs for people.




Gary Hart, the former Colorado senator ... worries about ... the threat to American democracy posed by its own large and permanent military establishment. It's not that Hart fears a Latin America-style generals' coup. The danger he sees is the widening divide between Washington governing elites, both political and military, and Americans at large. When Washington sends troops off to war zones without a full, frank debate on the objectives and potential costs, citizens are left ignorant and impotent. Someday, when an intervention goes awry, this elite decision-making will generate a political crisis.

"The of the military from society is unhealthy at best and dangerous at worst," Hart writes in his book The Minuteman. He proposes a radical solution: revive the tradition of citizen soldiers that existed before the Cold War fostered permanent mobilization. Shrink the regular forces drastically to one-quarter or one-third of their present size. Then let regulars train and supervise a well-equipped, well-trained volunteer force in the reserves and National Guard.

This shift would save many billions, but the larger purpose is to re-engage the broad American public in questions of national defense-the why and wherefore of going to war. If something like this doesn't happen, Hart foresees an explosive collision ahead. At a Washington forum, he warned the audience of policy thinkers: "The assumption in this town is that, once the political and military leaders make a decision to use the military, the American people will follow with their lives and their check books. This is an elitist assumption, and I think it is ending."

Hart's critique echoes the political turmoil of the Cold War years, especially during the ill-fated intervention in Vietnam when millions of citizens rebelled. Gary Hart was active then in antiwar politics and managed Senator George McGovern's I972 presidential campaign. Elected to the Senate two years later, he surprised both friends and adversaries by seeking a seat on the Armed Services Committee, where he became a respected voice on reforming military affairs. Now a lawyer for international business, he, too, is trying to provoke a larger debate.

During the Persian Gulf War, Hart says, American soldiers were essentially used like modern Hessians-a "mercenary army" hired to defend the decadent royal families of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The rhetoric was about freedom, but the real issue was access to cheap oil. The political establishment finds it easier to deploy military force in behalf of entrenched economic interests, he observes, than to confront the deeper changes required in energy consumption and production. Sooner or later, he expects the evasion to blow up in America's face.

"What happens if we wake up some morning and the Saudi royal family is overthrown?" Hart asks. "Our energy policy collapses. We will be in the desert again. And it won't be for six months."

The situation reminds him of the famous warning from President Dwight Eisenhower, back in I958, about the military-industrial complex's encroaching political influence. "This is Eisenhower's nightmare," Hart asserts. "The military-industrial complex is dug in to defend economic interests that have nothing to do with national defense."

The Gulf War provided some supporting evidence for Hart's "citizen soldier." The Desert Storm force included some 230,00o reserve forces, and their performance, especially in supporting roles like airlift, was impressive and widely praised. On the other hand, the call-up of reserves did not provoke the lively debate on foreign policy objectives that Hart envisions, perhaps because the enemy was so inept and only I57 Americans died.

"Sooner or later," Hart predicts, "people are going to ask: Why do we have to have this huge military structure? Why do we have to spend $250 billion a year for a Bosnia, Haiti, or Somalia? I don't know anybody in this town who has an answer for that question. It's only a matter of time before someone gets and says: "The emperor has no clothes."

Compared to Washington's usual policy wonks, Michael Vlahos is clearly over the top. When I first met the forty-six-year old political scientist, he was dressed downtown-black jacket and slacks, black T-shirt and loafers-the right look for downtown Manhattan, but not D.C. During the Reagan years, Vlahos flourished as Cold War policy thinker and got his ticket punched at all the right places, from the CIA to the State Department. In the I990s, he collaborated closely with Representative Newt Gingrich on new ideas before he grasped that Gingrich's revolutionary talk was bogus.

Now he is utterly disillusioned with the governing elites and thus liberated from conventional thinking. These days, Michael Vlahos turns out intriguing, troubling, visionary essays on the future of war and why this new age is profoundly threatening for America, though not for the usual reasons.

"I have to say something that will sound terrible but may still be true," he begins. "We, the United States, may become the Darth Vader wearing the black helmet. We've created an industrial system that works for us and some allies but is imperial and seems oppressive to many others. We increasingly will find ourselves in the same position as empires of the past, the Persians and Romans, Spain under Phillip II, the British in the late nineteenth century. Any great empire trying to ride herd on the world in an age of major change is in danger."

The prognosis sounds apocalyptic and a bit elusive in the details, but Vlahos is trying to provoke a sober reading of history. Empires fall or are eclipsed, not because they are weak in the traditional terms, but because they fail to grasp the future- the new social and political realities spawned by their very own economic power and invention. In a high-octane essay in the spring I998 issue of the Washington Quarterly, entitled "The War After Byte City,'' Vlahos compares the hubris of American leaders to the arrogant French and British generals who got their comeuppance in the distant past:

"We are in the midst of an economic upheaval equivalent to the industrial revolution in its capacity to transform our lives.... But America's ruling elites have defined a world system that does not allow for the possibility of Big Change. Like the French plutocrats of the 1800s, the old Cold War establishment is pledged to preserve the old paradigm-meaning, centrally, itself.... Shorn of its entitling Cold War, the U.S. ruling establishment now wishes to extend the noblesse oblige necessary to manage an unruly world- at all costs. It defines the United States as the status quo power, its sacred word is stability and its imperative verb is to manage.



Paranoia was always a vital element in cold war ideology, and fearful alarms were regularly announced about others in the world threatening America. If South Vietnam were lost to the Communists, it was said, their next stop would be San Francisco. If Nicaragua became a Soviet outpost in our hemisphere, Reagan told us, the enemy would soon be marching on Texas. It seems bizarre now, even silly, that citizens of the richest nation on earth could be so easily spooked...

If Americans can get beyond the old insecurities, the end of the Cold War is a great opportunity to re-imagine the world in new terms: a world without empires. A renewed system of international relations is possible now, one that is not controlled by the United States or anyone else. America could make itself the natural leader for achieving this historic transition. Or it could remain the status quo power, standing in the way of the future, surpressing change and accumulating resentment around the world.

The globalization of commerce and finance-marketing and production and investing-has created a great new opening for everyone as well as colossal potential for economic breakdown and nationalist conflict, even shooting wars. Like it or not, we are now connected to distant others-as buyers and sellers, as workers and investors. Are we building a new world of promise and equity or exploitation and anger? Right now, our awesome power is deployed to defend the rights of capital and commerce, but not human rights and people exploited by the global system.

The voluminous policy literature on fighting the next war scarcely acknowledges the war-and-peace implications of the globalizing economy. Nor does our government. Washington is putting up bailout aid of $3 billion for the deeply corrupt regime in Indonesia, which suppresses labor rights and other human freedoms. America's leading multinational corporations are building advanced-technology production for China on the backs of $60a-month factory workers who are disciplined by Community Party cadres. The financial turmoil that recently devastated developing economies in Asia and Latin America looks like a Wall Street conspiracy to the victims in Malaysia or Thailand.

The point is made by Robert Borosage, director of the Campaign for America's Future, in the succinct phrase: "No justice, no peace. War arises from many sources, rational and irrational, but the weak will naturally find their enemy in the wealthy and powerful who are running the system... Borosage wrote recently in the Boston Review:

"In this extraordinary time, our focus should be on building the structures of peace-the harder, softer tasks of securing minimal decency, bolstering democracy and the rule of law, strengthening international peacekeeping and peacemaking institutions, and dealing with such real world causes of tension as economic upheaval, mass displacement, environmental catastrophe. resource rivalries, religious and nationalist passions."

In the turmoil of the Post-Cold war peace, some things have not really changed. In national security, we have settled for a bit less of the same. What we really need is to rethink the whole idea.

Instead of concocting glamorous new weapons systems, Americans might move to higher ground and dream of a common humanity. Instead of searching the world for likely enemies, Americans should recognize that, in this new age, we are all riding in the same boat.



To mention these old Cold War rationales opens up rich questions about our present sense of purpose. Does America still ') maintain its burgeoning military apparatus in order to advance human freedoms? Or to protect the free flows of multinational production and finance? Are we struggling to democratize the globe or merely to clear a path for global corporations?

... Raising questions of environmental protection, labor rights, or social equity-not to mention the democratic principles of free speech and freedom of assembly-is described as an intrusion on the trading system, possibly even an impediment to the spread of prosperity. National sovereignty (including America's) is told to yield to the efficiencies of globalizing enterprises.



The Pentagon and the CIA maintained close relations with Suharto even though his government was always a fascist regime, that is, one that fuses military-business-political power Multinational enterprises built many factories and banks there and paid the corrupt tolls (such as including the generals in joint ventures) for the privilege of access to Indonesia's cheap labor and burgeoning market.

In an oblique sense, the companies were reimbursed. While Suharto's cronies imposed irregular costs on doing business, the government also guaranteed that wages would be held artificially low, since any attempts to develop free trade unions or political opposition were smashed. This trade-off was not secret; everyone understood it. As recently as I995, the United States averted its gaze while Suharto smashed a promising independent labor movement, arrested its leaders, and charged them with subversion.



What do Americans want, now that they have won the peace? To be left alone to enjoy it, many would answer. Certainly, most Americans do not want to go looking for trouble in the world. And, of course, many do still yearn for a simpler time in the past, when their vital young nation felt self-sufficient and believed it could turn its back on the entangling business of international politics. Those currents of opinion do exist, for sure, but they are negative responses to the question.

The startling news-startling because it gets scant recognition from the press and politicians-is that Americans also express an overwhelming consensus on some positive outlines for national security and global relations. These viewpoints are largely ignored by policy makers and political leaders, perhaps because the public's vision of the future is wildly at odds with the conventional wisdom of governing elites.

Here are some propositions that might be called the "People's Choices" for how to create a new world order, each proposal followed by the percentage of citizens who endorse it in a recent opinion survey:

The United States should use its position to get other countries to take action against world environmental problems.


1 here should 6e a general understanding among nations that any country threatening to use chemical or nuclear weapons must 6e stopped, even if that means the use of military force 6y the United States and other countries.


The United Nations should play a much bigger peace-keeping and diplomatic role than it did before the Gulf War.


The countries of the world should act together, not on their own, to deter and resist aggression.


The United Nations should tax international arms sales with the money going to famine relief and humanitarian aid.


The United States should use its position to promote democracy in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and elsewhere in the world.


The use of force seldom solves problems. The United States and the United Nations should rely on economic sanctions, diplomatic pressure, and judicial remedies in handling international threats.


As this suggests, Americans as a whole are not hostile to the United Nations or other international venues for resolving conflict and maintaining peace. On the contrary, they greatly favor that approach to unilateral mobilizations by the United States. The same opinion survey asked them directly: "Thinking about the United States and the United Nations, when faced with future problems involving aggression, who should take the lead?" Across a series of polls, 80 to 8, percent chose the United Nations. Only II to I7 percent preferred that the United States take the lead.

Can this be the same American public we read about in the newspapers? The folks who supposedly despise the United Nations? Who are bored by foreign affairs, oblivious to global problems, ready to withdraw from the world? Evidently not.

Or perhaps there are two quite different "publics" present in American political life-one whose positive reflections are largely neglected and another whose fears or misgivings are endlessly massaged and amplified in order to energize political campaigns and causes. Certainly, the "progressive" public gets very little representation by political leaders of stature.

The standard political response to such forward-looking opinions as the ones I have cited is that these expressions are nothing more than wishful thinking-pious and uninformed sentiments that float disconnected from the real politics of governing. When asked about their goals, Americans do tend to opt for happy endings-good schools and full employment, universal health care, peace and prosperity. Why not? We are an optimistic, generous people.

But the positive aspirations of the American public do not count for much in politics, either on domestic matters or in foreign policy. That is one measure of the decayed condition of American democracy, one related to the absence of genuine dialogue and accountability between representatives and the represented. Knowing how easily poll results can be manipulated, smart politicians say: "Don't trust what the public believes it wants" (unless their yearnings can be packaged as rhetorical "issues" for campaigns). In any case, politicians have learned that they can safely ignore the public's idealistic goals without fear of retribution...

... American military leaders and foreign policy architects are marching in a different direction from the public's bolder vision of post-cold War prospects. The lesson learned in Vietnam-that military interventions cannot be sustained without broad popular support-has lost much of its cautionary punch in governing circles, but it remains highly relevant to America's future.

Public opinion can be fickle, we know, and easily manipulated by propaganda blitzes in the form of clever TV commercials. But the broad, consistent aspirations expressed by the people should provide the basis for serious questioning of some of the specific policies the government is now pursuing in international affairs. Governing elites believe in their own expertise, but on some matters, unwashed public opinion is way ahead of the experts.

The government, for instance, actively promotes (and subsidizes) arms exports by U.S. manufacturers. The public thinks the global arms trade threatens peace. Indeed, people think all international arms sales, including U.S. weapons, should be taxed (not by Washington but by the United Nations). When opinion surveyors pointed out that taxes would dampen sales and may hurt American workers and companies, people did not back off.

Americans at large are preoccupied with the environmental crisis and put it at the very top of their list of global dangers. The administration did ultimately accept the Kyoto agreement on global warming, but not without first trying to use its muscle to water down the terms. And major industrial sectors are intent on blocking its implementation in Congress by sounding alarms about the supposedly dreadful economic impact for Americans.

It seems fair to ask: Who is doing the wishful thinking on this global environmental issue-the governing elites in politics and business or the untutored public?

In terms of economic self-interest, the American people may realize the job opportunities in the environmental problem even though their leaders do not yet recognize them. A study by Miriam Pemberton and Michael Renner of the National Commission on Economic Conversion and Disarmament notes that the world market for environmental technologies is double the global market for all types of military hardware. U.S. exports of enviro-tech goods already exceed arms exports, and the disparity is sure to widen.

Yet the U.S. government spends twelve times more on promoting arms sales abroad than on environmental technologies. Japan, Germany, and other industrial nations that are not burdened by such an awesome defense industry are doing the opposite-and stealing the march on a growth sector that is more promising (and fruitful for the world) than weaponry.

America goes its own way on other global issues, despite the public yearning for greater cooperation. The international diplomacy that produced a new global treaty abolishing antipersonnel landmines was not led by Washington. The Pentagon objected. The White House acceded to the military's anxieties. Other nations persisted anyway (and rejected dilutions and exceptions demanded by the United States). In the end, the largest military establishment in the world-ours-stands outside the world consensus, joined by a few other outlier nations like China.

Likewise, the Clinton administration has blocked a new international treaty prohibiting the world's military forces from recruiting children under eighteen as armed troops. Washington also insists on limiting the powers of the new international criminal court that other nations seek to create. The ATI surveys found that Americans overwhelmingly support the creation of international judicial tribunals that will have the "force of law" to prevent and punish lawless behavior.

In sum, Washington assumes an influence over events that is fast eroding. If the present drift of events continues, the American government will find itself increasingly isolated from the world opinion it presumes to lead. It will also be alienated from its own people. This is not a formula for imperial stability.



The weapons industry has lost its glow since Fortress America was first published, with corporate profits and stock prices declining sharply. On the other hand, the companies may now be convinced that their painful lull in defense spending is finally ending. Both Republicans and Democrats are promising to reverse the post-Cold War trend and begin appropriating major budget increases for the Pentagon again, especially for procurement. The public seems to be slowly awakening to the implications. With luck, we may witness a genuine argument over national priorities during the presidential campaign in 2000 but, if so, it must be generated by alarmed citizens since honest debate and reform isn't likely to emerge from Washington.

The military-industrial complex's collision between desire and wherewithal has ripened considerably in the last few years-that is, the gap between available funding and spending commitments has steadily widened. This was no secret to insiders, of course, but it took a very public turn in the fall of 1998 when the Joint Chiefs of Staff reluctantly acknowledged to the Senate armed services committee that, yes, the internal budget tensions are beginning to have a deteriorating impact on the fighting readiness of the forces. Many senators who knew better professed to be shocked.

In the political theater that followed, Senator McCain asked the service chiefs to enumerate exactly what it would take to bring the U.S. armed forces up to speed. Their collective answer was a bountiful wish list, totaling $125 billion. Both parties expressed a desire to increase the Pentagon's budget in real terms (especially if the money was improving conditions for servicemen and women) and began to do so modestly, with an $8 billion add-on in 1998. In his next budget, President Clinton proposed much more: cumulative increases that would eventually take the defense budget to around $310 billion. Republicans naturally topped that and embraced a goal of defense spending around $350 billion.

The prospect is breathtaking-the nation expanding its military budget by nearly one third in the midst of general peace. Fortunately, that prospect is also quite fictional, though the election-season rhetoric makes it especially difficult to know what the real intentions are. The more expansive numbers are impossible to achieve, in any case. First, there are the competing priorities under the rigorous budget ceilings imposed since 1997. Even with supposed surpluses ahead for the federal government, Congress cannot break the spending caps on defense without taking the money from somewhere else.

As this reality unfolds during the next few years, the contest may finally form around questions of priority: Shall we fund Medicare and Medicaid or build more attack submarines? Do we need those aircraft carriers more than we need new schools or more teachers? That at least is the hopeful possibility. A new organization-Business Leaders for Sensible Priorities-has been launched by progressive executives and former military leaders to sharpen the debate in exactly this way. Led by Ben Cohen, co-founder of Ben & Jerry's Ice Cream, the group intends to conduct a broad campaign of public education, along with many pointed questions directed at the candidates.

The goal of Business Leaders for Sensible Priorities is modest and rational. Based on budget analysis by respected military experts, the group argues that, instead of increases, the defense budget should be reduced by $40 billion a year and the money shifted to domestic needs. This can be accomplished without injury to national security, as many military authorities know and have written themselves. The question really is: how long will the political nostalgia for the Cold War allow the military to ride along free-without serious reform-while expending tens of billions on yesterday's defense system? The day of reckoning seems closer...

The ideal remedy, is ... a genuine, robust re-examination of national defense in this new world without a major enemy, a hard-nosed scrutiny of the perpetual technical additions to existing weaponry, a smart but sympathetic restructuring of the uniformed forces themselves. If we cannot have such a patient and rational discussion, then let us hope for the next best thing: that the American people will eventually, finally, get angry-angry about the wasted billions and misplaced national priorities-and take their anger out on the elected politicians who neglect these great questions. If such vengeance is someday visited on the politicians and the military and the weapons makers, they will have earned it.

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