President Harry Truman and Hiroshima

excerpted from the book

Lying for Empire

How to Commit War Crimes With A Straight Face

by David Model

Common Courage Press, 2005, paper

 

p45
On November 25, 1941, after a meeting of the War Cabinet, Secretary of War Stimson wrote in his diary that the President:
Brought up the event that we were likely to be attacked perhaps (as soon as) next Monday, for the Japanese are notorious for making an attack without warning and the question was what we should do. The question was how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without too much danger to ourselves. (A. Russell Buchanan, The United States and World War II)

This reveals that the U.S. was angling for a fight, for an excuse and justification to enter the war. Because the Roosevelt administration understood that it had cut off 88% of the oil supply, they knew it was only a matter of time before Japan, starved for oil, would attack in an attempt to regain access to oil. The subsequent claim that Pearl Harbor was an unprovoked surprise attack that "shall live in infamy" counts as one of the most important presidential lies of all time.

p58
After the B-29s were shifted to the Marianas the Americans conducted I a raid against an aircraft plant in Tokyo. During this mission, the planes flew at 32,000 feet and were impervious to Japanese flak and fighters. For the next three months, the bombing raids targeted the aircraft industry. General Curtis LeMay, who was in command of the B-29s, concluded that to inflict greater damage during bombing raids, the aircraft would need to shift to incendiary bombs which contained napalm, a jellied form of petroleum that exploded upon impact engulfing everything in the vicinity in flames.

On February 4, 1945, bombers carrying incendiary bombs struck at Kobe, Japan's sixth largest city. The result was that five of the twelve main factories were damaged as well as one of the two shipyards. A second raid with incendiary bombs struck Tokyo on February 25 and destroyed 28,000 structures (homes, factories etc.). On March 8, 1945, LeMay ordered a largescale bombing of Tokyo involving 334 bombers. Almost sixteen square miles of the city was incinerated and 267,000 buildings were destroyed. More than 83,000 people were killed and another 41,000 were injured. By early June, Tokyo, Nagoya, Kobe, Osaka, Yokohama, and Kawasaki were subject to further bombings. Ronald H. Spector in Eagle Against the Sun: The American War With Japan, described the destruction as:

Over 40% of the total urban area of these cities had been gutted; millions had been rendered homeless. LeMay next turned to the destruction of Japan's smaller cities. His bomber force, now almost 600 strong, ranged over Japan almost at will, visiting destruction on half a hundred smaller cities and manufacturing centres.

At this point in the war, Japan's cities had been severely damaged, the industrial base virtually destroyed, the navy and air force rendered useless, and the people left suffering from starvation.

... Despite the massive victories scored against Japan, American leaders were not celebrating because they were dreading the invasion of Japan itself. U.S. military planners were very apprehensive about Japanese soldiers fighting in their homeland because they had already demonstrated their unyielding tenacity and truculence elsewhere. A number of options were discussed including:

* invade Japan and fight until the Japanese surrender;
* demand a surrender with terms other than an unconditional surrender and threaten to use a new highly destructive weapon (atomic bomb);
* demand unconditional surrender with the same threat;
* demand either conditional or unconditional surrender and not warn the Japanese about the new weapon;
* demand either conditional or unconditional surrender and demonstrate the new weapon;
* respond to Japanese attempts (mostly through the Soviet Union) to negotiate the terms of the surrender.

Many high level meetings and committees discussed these and other options at great length for many months. The events leading up to the conclusion of the war as well as the behind-the-scene discussions and diary entries of key figures are instrumental in understanding the motives of President Truman (President Roosevelt died in April) in making the decision about how to end the war.

A number of important events preceded the use of the atomic bombs. On April 1945, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered their field commanders to make plans for the invasion of Japan. Discussions about where to begin the invasion were heated but a consensus was finally reached to invade Kyushu. The Joint Chiefs of Staff presented the plan to President Truman with an estimate of the number of American lives that would be lost. The number was mere speculation and was not based on any sound rational process but On an extrapolation based on the number of casualties in Okinawa. Some military officers contemplated the possibility of ending the war without an invasion

One of the most controversial issues in the Pacific theatre was t'' debate over the terms of surrender to be offered to Japan. In 1943, Roosevelt, Churchill and their military advisors met in Casablanca to discuss strategy. The British War Cabinet and President Roosevelt's advisors had already discussed the terms of surrender and at a press conference held at the end of the Casablanca Conference, Roosevelt announced that the Allied Powers were striving for an "unconditional surrender." The term was first coined by Ulysses S. Grant in the Civil War.

Unconditional surrender implied that the institution of Emperor would be abolished and this was one of the stumbling blocks to a Japanese surrender. Japanese fears about the Emperor were not groundless. American leaders such as Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, believed that the Emperor symbolized the military clique that dominated Japan and, therefore, must not survive the war. A June 1945 Gallup poll revealed that 33% of Americans wanted the Emperor to be executed as a war criminal.

In Japanese society, the Emperor was regarded as a deity similar to Jesus or Buddha. Gar Alperovitz in The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb described the tradition of the Emperor:
The godhood of the Emperor was a tradition which traced back to 660 9) B.C. and the first Japanese Emperor, Jimmu, who was, according to legend, a descendant of the sun goddess Amaterasu, made him and all of his successors also divine beings. 7 The status of the Emperor would explain Japanese consternation about an "unconditional surrender." It is not clear that losing the Emperor was a critical issue for the Americans since, in the end, the Emperor was retained anyway.

The terms of surrender and the use of the bomb were on the agenda of a high-level committee appointed by President Truman. As a result of a meeting on April 25, 1945, Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson and President Truman proposed the creation of the Interim Committee. Its mandate was to operate only between early May and the actual use of the bomb (the decision to use the atomic bomb had not been made yet). One of the recommendations of the committee was the retention of the Emperor. The Interim Committee also recommended that:
... the Secretary of War should be advised that, while recognizing that the final selection of the target was essentially a military decision, the present view of the Committee was that the bomb should be used against Japan as soon as possible; that it be used on a war plant surrounded by workers' homes; and that it be used without prior warning.

p62
In the months prior to the Potsdam meeting, the Allied leaders were very concerned about the strength and intentions of the Soviet Union after the war. Acting Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew summed up their concern:
Already Russia is showing us-in Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia-the future world pattern that she visualizes and will aim to create. With her certain stranglehold on these countries, Russia's power will steadily increase and she will in the not distant future be in a favorable position to expand her control, step by step through Europe. (Gar Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb)

President Truman was advised that:
If expectations were to be realized, he [Stimson] told me, the atomic bomb would be certain to have a decisive influence on our relations with other countries. And if it worked, the bomb, in all probability, would shorten the war. Byrnes had already told me that the weapon might be so powerful as to be potentially capable of wiping out entire cities and killing people on an unprecedented scale. And he added that in his belief the bomb might well put us in a position to dictate our terms at the end of the war. (Gar Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb)

The expression "dictating our terms" is in reference to the Soviet Union whose expansionist ambitions were no secret.

Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson reported that:
I told him [Assistant Secretary of War-John J. Mcloy] that my own opinion was that the time now and the method now to deal with Russia was to keep our mouths shut and let our actions speak for words. The Russians will understand them better than anything else. It is a case where we have got to retain the lead and perhaps do it in a pretty rough and realistic way. (Gar Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb)

A War Department staff report recognized that:
In destroying Germany, the nation that set out to dominate Europe using force, we have made Russia, a nation with an economic system of national monopoly, the unquestionably dominant power in Europe. (Gar Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb)

P. M. S. Blackett, a British Nobel Prize-winning physicist, concluded that:
... the dropping of the atomic bomb was not so much the last military act of the Second World War as the first major operation of the cold diplomatic war with Russia.

But using civilians from a third country as a warning of America's new, highly destructive weapon has to rank as one of the greatest crimes against humanity. To sacrifice two cities and about 150,000 people to inform your post-war adversary that they may be next is unadulterated insanity.

Leo Szilard, an atomic scientist who met with James F. Byrnes noted that:
Mr. Byrnes did not argue that it was necessary to use the bomb against the cities of Japan in order to win the war. He knew at the time, as the rest of the government knew that Japan was essentially defeated and that we could win the war in another six months. At that time Mr. Byrnes was much concerned about the spreading of Russian influence in Europe... [Mr. Byrnes view was] that our possessing and demonstrating the bomb would make Russia more manageable in Europe. (Gar Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb)

The Soviet Union's growing power, influence, and ambitions were causing the American leaders a gnawing disquietude about the distribution of power in the post-war world. Their apprehensions were based on Soviet ideology, as understood in the West, on Soviet ambitions for world domination and on their maneuvers to gain control of Eastern Europe and much of Japanese territory as possible. Both became critical factors in lied thinking about how to end the war. According to Bill Gordon in Reflections Hiroshima:
... American leaders had concerns that the Soviet Union would occupy Manchuria and would share the occupation of Japan with the U.S.; in addition, American leaders believed that dropping the bomb would strengthen their position with the Soviet Union concerning their sphere of influence in Eastern Europe.

As well, Gar Alperovitz, in The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb, observed that:
The primary focal point... is the fact that throughout the spring and summer of 1945 American officials developed their thinking on the use of the atomic bomb in close relationship in the planning of U.S. diplomacy towards the Soviet Union.

Truman's strong concern about the post-war Soviet threat was the primary factor in his repeated attempts to postpone the Potsdam conference. He was waiting for a successful test of the atom bomb before meeting with Stalin.

Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson suggested at a meeting with President Truman that:
... the greatest complication was what might happen at the meeting of the Big Three. He told me he had postponed that until the 15th of July on purpose to give us more time. (Gar Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb)

When President Truman responded to Prime Minister Churchill's plea for a big three meeting as early as possible, he stated that ". . . it will be very difficult for me to be absent from Washington before the fiscal year (June 30)." Churchill responded on May 11 with "I would have suggested the middle of June but for your reference to your fiscal year (June 30) because I feel that every minute counts" and on May 13 "In this case I consider that we should try to bring the meeting off sometime in June, and I hope your fiscal year will not delay it..." Finally, in complete frustration, Churchill sent a cable to President Truman protesting that:
... I consider that July 15, repeat July the month after June, is much too late for the urgent questions that demand attention between us... 1 have proposed June 15, repeat June the month before July, but if that is not possible why not July 1, 2, or 3? (Gar Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb)

In a meeting with President Truman on May 21, Joseph E. Davies, former Ambassador to Moscow, explained that:
He did not want to meet until July. He had his budget on his hands. He also told me of another reason, etc. The test [of the bomb] was set for June, but had been postponed for July. (Gar Alperovitz, The Decision the Use the Atomic Bomb)

President Truman's posture toward the Soviet Union shifted after he became aware that a test of the atomic bomb was imminent. Originally, he needed the Soviet Union to declare war against Japan to draw some of the Japanese resources away from the war against the U.S. After the successful test of the nuclear weapon, Truman decided that he could terminate the war with Japan without Soviet assistance and he did not want the Russians to have a share in the Pacific pie. Ronald H. Spector, in Eagles Against the Sun: The American War With Japan, observed that:
With the atomic bomb a reality, the participation of the Soviets in the war against Japan now appeared unnecessary, if not actually undesirable. Ever since Yalta some American leaders had had doubts about the value of Soviet participation, and now General Marshall again advised the President that the Soviets were not really needed.

p66
Two crucial questions must be answered about the terms of surrender. Firstly, were the Japanese prepared to surrender if there was a guarantee to retain the Emperor? Secondly, if the Japanese were prepared to surrender on these terms, was Truman aware of it? According to Gar Alperovitz in The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb:
Truman had been fully aware of the key intercepts (something he had privately confirmed to State Department interviewers four years earlier [than 1960 when the official Potsdam Papers were published], in January 1956).

Fragments of other intercepts to which President Truman was privy included:

* On May 12, 1942, William Donovan, Director of the OSS reported to Truman that Shunichi Kase (Japanese Minister to Switzerland) stated that he "...believes that one of the few provisions the Japanese would insist upon would be the retention of the Emperor..."

* On August 11, 1944, Magic reports of intercepted messages designated "Eyes Only" for the President, such as "Foreign Minister Shigemitsu has instructed Ambassador Sato [in

Moscow] to find out whether Russia is willing to assist in bringing about a negotiated peace... " It seems highly unlikely that he would have taken such a step without having consulted at least some members of the new Japanese Cabinet.

* On May 7, 1945, a peace feeler from Portugal directly to Truman from the OSS representative reported that "...the Japanese are ready to cease hostilities, provided they are allowed to retain possession of their home islands." Then again on May 19, "On this occasion Inoue declared that actual peace terms were unimportant so long as the term 'unconditional surrender' was not employed."

* On July 16, 1945, William Donovan sent the President a report on P. Jacobson (Swedish economic advisor to the Bank for International Settlements) informing Truman that "Throughout discussions with Jacobson, the Japanese officials stressed only two points: (a) the preservation of the Emperor, and (b) the possibility of returning to the constitution promulgated in 1889." (Gar Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb)

p68
Secretary of State Byrnes was not only a friend of President Truman but became his closest advisor. Byrnes strong support for the use of the atomic bomb without any warning not only influenced the President but also influenced the Interim Committee whose recommendations comprised most of the Potsdam Declaration. According to the New York Times:
... it was understood that Mr. Byrnes would in effect, replace Harry Hopkins as Presidential confidant, and, it was asserted, receive far more authority than a President has yet yielded to any man.

Byrne's assistant Walter Brown observed that:
The President and Mr. Byrnes talked for an hour and it was apparent Truman was looking to Byrnes for guidance.. . Truman said he considered Byrnes one of his best friends and realized that he knew more about government than anyone else around and, therefore, he wanted Byrnes' help. (Gar Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb)

Secretary Byrnes was single-minded with respect to his views about how to end the war. He was uncompromising about the terms of surrender. According to Gar Alperovitz in The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb:
... Byrnes is a prime candidate for the advisor who helped Truman draft his still-unexplained June 1 no-compromise stand on unconditional surrender... So far as we can tell Byrnes was the only advisor whose views were fully compatible with this position at this time.

As well, Gar Alperovitz, in the Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb, concluded that:
In general, it appears that Byrnes not only regarded the atomic bomb as extremely important to his diplomacy towards Russia, but that in advising Truman he took a very narrow view of its role. Minimally, he seems to have seen it from the very beginning as leverage to help American diplomacy, and, more likely, as the critical factor which-if shrewdly handled-would allow the United States to impose its own terms once its power was demonstrated.

Given the context in which President Truman would be making the decision about ending the war, there would seem to be a predisposition toward using the bomb. The Interim Committee had recommended dropping the bomb; Truman's closest advisor strongly favoured the bomb; and the climate of apprehension about Soviet expansionism strengthened the case for using the atomic bomb.

The fear of an expanding Soviet Empire after the war was a major problem for American policy-makers because it would threaten the magnitude and strength of the American Empire. Apprehension of Soviet intentions and the expansion of the American Empire would play a key role in how to end the war with Japan.

Another major issue to be considered was whether an invasion of Japan would cost substantially more lives than dropping the bomb. One of the mythical justifications invoked to support the use of atomic weapons assumed a fraudulent dichotomy between dropping the bomb and invading Japan. The justification was mythical because the President did not have any serious discussions with the military about the potential loss of lives and most military leaders rejected the use of nuclear weapons. As well, there were many other options. American leaders were aware of Japanese peace feelers from diplomatic intercepts and therefore, negotiations offered the potential to end the war without the loss of any more live/s.

... The argument about minimizing the loss of life ignores the fact that most military leaders were opposed to using the bomb and were not consulted. Gar Alperovitz in The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb pointed out that:
When we turn to the testimony of the top military leaders themselves, the evidence not only confirms that their advice was not seriously sought, but also (with one possible ambiguous exception) strongly suggests that none believed the use of the atomic bomb was dictated by overwhelming military considerations. Several expressed deep revulsion at the idea of targeting a city.

That lack of consultation doesn't represent blundering on the part of civilian leaders including Truman. Rather, it supports the idea that the use of the weapon was not going to be a military but a diplomatic decision. The decision was going to be based largely on considerations of empire and therefore military input was secondary.

Fleet Admiral William D. Leay, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, offered the opinion that:
... the use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were almost ' defeated and ready to surrender.., in being the first to use it, we... adopted an J ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages. (Gar Alperovitz, Was Hiroshima Necessary to End the War)

Major General Curtis E. during a press conference on September 20, 1945, made it clear that military considerations were not in play when he stated that:
The war would have been over in two weeks without the Russians and without the atomic bomb. The atomic bomb had nothing to do with the end of Lt the war at all. (Gar Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb)

p75
Admiral William "Bull" Halsey, commander of the Third Fleet
"The first atomic bomb was an unnecessary experiment It was a mistake ever to drop it... (the scientists) had this toy and they wanted to try it out, so they dropped it... It killed a lot of Japs, but the Japs had put out a lot of peace feelers through Russia long before."

p76
General Dwight D. Eisenhower
I voiced my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary and secondly because the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives."

p78
There are two ways to assess whether President Truman committed crimes against humanity.

The first is the Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Nuremberg trials which applies to this case. President Truman violated the following clauses in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal:

Article 6

b. War Crimes: namely violations of the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall include... murder, ill-treatment.., of civilian population... wanton destruction of cities, towns, or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity;

c. Crimes against Humanity: namely, murder, extermination .... of civilian population...

The other way to evaluate President Truman's culpability is to apply international laws which were created after the end of WW II. He violated the following clauses in the Geneva Conventions:

1. Convention IV, Part 1, Article 3, clause 1,-protection of civilians;

2. Convention IV, Chapter III, article 52-protection of nonmilitary objects:

3. Protocol I, Chapter II, Article 51, clause 4-indiscriminate attacks.

President Truman lied to the American people about his motives for dropping the two atomic bombs. He also misled the public about the nature of the first target. In a radio speech on August 9, 1945, he gave assurances that "The world will note that the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, a military base." (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States) The killing of over 100,000 civilians, the devastation of two cities, the deaths and diseases resulting from radiation poisoning, and the ominous precedent of using nuclear weapons are categorically crimes against humanity.


Lying for Empire

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